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The Prison of Convenience:
The Need for National Regulation of
Biometric Technology in Sports Venues
Kirsten Flicker*
In recent years, biometric data has crept its way into sports
venues. In 2015, Major League Baseball began to use fingerprinting
at stadium entrances. More recently, reporters have alerted
spectators to the use of facial recognition technology in arenas such
as Madison Square Garden. Proponents of these developments
insist that the technology conveniences spectators, increases venue
security, and enhances the overall spectator experience. Yet these
claims fail to take into account the possibility of irremediable data
breaches, the inaccuracies in facial recognition technology, and the
privacy and unfair and deceptive trade practice concerns this
technology raises. Further, there is an overarching concern about
the lack of regulation of biometric data. This Note examines the
benefits and concerns of biometric technology as well as the options
for regulating it. Ultimately, this Note finds that national regulation
of biometric technology would best serve sports spectators. In
particular, this Note recommends a uniform standard for venues in
all states that requires transparency of biometric data policies, and
protection of spectator data.
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INTRODUCTION
Going to a Mets game used to begin with a long line and an usher
checking paper tickets. For blacklisted fans, it meant passing
through the gates, unnoticed.1 A Mets game used to mean vendors
parading through the grandstands and exchanging cracker jacks and
beer for cash. Now, in the modern era of biometrics, going to a Mets
game begins with having your fingerprint taken at a CLEAR booth.2
Facial recognition identifies blacklisted fans and denies them entry.3
Beer is purchased at a cashier-less, artificial intelligence (“AI”)powered kiosk.4 Without many even realizing it, biometric
technology has redesigned the experience of going to a ballgame
from start to finish.
Major League Baseball (“MLB”) is not the only professional
sports league whose stadiums have embraced biometric technology.
1

A blacklisted fan is a fan who is banned from the venue due to disreputable behavior.
See Blacklist, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
blacklist [https://perma.cc/G25P-MXUS].
2
See Sports, CLEAR, https://www.clearme.com/sports [https://perma.cc/C8B7CZNC].
3
See Steve Lasky, Fear Strikes Out, SECURITY INFO WATCH (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.securityinfowatch.com/access-identity/access-control/article/12426642/
security-at-citi-field-ups-its-game-with-a-blend-of-technology-and-staff-experience
[https://perma.cc/5QM8-HCDP].
4
See Mets Add Self-Checkout Kiosk to Citi Field, BALLPARK DIG. (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://ballparkdigest.com/2019/09/24/mets-add-self-checkout-kiosk-to-citi-field/
[https://perma.cc/3N6T-VUAU].
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From Madison Square Garden for the New York Knicks and New
York Rangers5 to CenturyLink Field for the Seattle Seahawks,6
sports venues around the country use biometrics such as fingerprints
and facial recognition to reimagine the sports spectator experience.7
Ticketing and concession sales are powered by fingerprinting,8 and
advertisements and music are selected using facial recognition.9 As
biometric technology continues to advance, sports venues continue
to find innovative ways to integrate the technology into the gamegoing experience. Many of these uses may seem glamorous, such as
reduced time spent waiting in lines, and enhanced security.10 Yet,
the personal and irreplaceable nature of biometric data makes
it particularly sensitive to breaches.11 Further, evidence of inaccuracies in facial recognition raises serious questions about this technology’s effectiveness.12
This Note highlights how biometric data such as fingerprints and
facial recognition is being used in sports venues, and, at present, is
largely unregulated. Part I explains what biometric data is and how
sports venues utilize it. This Part focuses on current fingerprinting
and facial recognition uses, as well as uses that venues are expected
to implement in the near future. Part II examines the advantages and
disadvantages of biometric technology in sports venues. First, it
discusses the benefits of increased convenience, security, and
innovative spectator experience. Next, it comments on the proof of

5

See Kevin Draper, Madison Square Garden Has Used Face-Scanning Technology on
Customers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/sports/
facial-recognition-madison-square-garden.html [https://perma.cc/8S9M-L4HD].
6
See CLEAR Partners with Seattle Seahawks, Sounders & Mariners to Launch IndustryLeading Biometric Payments & ID Check for Fast, Frictionless Concessions, BUS. WIRE
(Aug. 6, 2018, 3:39 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180806005577/
en/CLEAR-Partners-Seattle-Seahawks-Sounders-Mariners-Launch
[https://perma.cc/R87N-93E3] [hereinafter CLEAR Partners with Seattle Seahawks].
7
See Draper, supra note 5.
8
See Sports, supra note 2.
9
See Jessica Golden & Eric Chemi, Sports Teams Are Using Facial Recognition to
Learn More About Their Fan Bases, CNBC (Apr. 21, 2018, 11:42 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/04/21/facial-recognition-helps-teams-and-advertisers-learn-aboutfans.html [https://perma.cc/3GSH-LVE6].
10
See infra Part II.A.
11
See infra Part II.B.1, 3.
12
See infra Part II.B.2.
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inaccuracy in facial recognition, and the privacy, security, and unfair
and deceptive trade practice concerns that have been noted about the
use of this technology.
Part III then reviews the existing biometric statutes and
regulations and examines some proposed regulations. This Part first
considers the recent urge for a moratorium on facial recognition.
Then, it discusses the proposed federal statute, federal guidelines,
the European Union (“EU”) statute, and current and proposed state
statutes. In particular, this Part focuses on how these statutes and
regulations address transparency, security exceptions, data
protection, deletion, and remedies for violations. Finally, Part IV
recommends national regulation of biometrics in sports venues in
order to maximize the technology’s benefits and minimize its
detriments. Overall, this Note recommends that this nationwide
regulatory scheme emphasize data protection and meaningful notice
and consent for all uses of biometrics.
I. BIOMETRIC DATA IN SPORTS VENUES
A. What is Biometric Data?
Biometrics are the “measurement and analysis of unique
physical or behavior characteristics.”13 Common forms of biometric
data include fingerprints, eyes (specifically irises and retinas), DNA,
heart rates, and facial features.14 Biometric data is a type of personally identifiable information (“PII”), defined by the Office of Management and Budget as “information which can be used to
distinguish or trace an individual’s identity.”15 Wearable technology
13

Biometrics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
biometrics [https://perma.cc/7JMR-L7G8].
14
See Biometric, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/biometric [https://
perma.cc/5HCJ-FMPB]; Types of Biometrics, BIOMETRICS INST., https://www.biometrics
institute.org/what-is-biometrics/types-of-biometrics/
[https://perma.cc/TEJ4-YLLQ];
Lauren Stewart, Big Data Discrimination: Maintaining Protection of Individual Privacy
Without Disincentivizing Businesses’ Use of Biometric Data to Enhance Security, 60 B.C.
L. REV. 349, 356 n.49 (2019).
15
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM FROM
CLAY THOMPSON III, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MANAGEMENT, SAFEGUARDING AGAINST AND
RESPONDING TO THE BREACH OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (May 22, 2007).
In fact, on July 26, 2019, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the Stop Hacks and
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such as Fitbits,16 DNA tests such as 23andMe,17 and iris scans like
NEXUS Global Entry at airports18 measure these “unique,
permanent and collectable” biological characteristics.19
Biometric data both identifies individuals and verifies individual
identities.20 Identification answers the question “who is this
person?” whereas verification answers the question “is this person
who they say they are?”21 When used to identify, an individual’s
biometric data is compared to a database to determine if it matches
any of the existing profiles.22 Law enforcement employs this technique routinely.23 For example, border security uses live facial
recognition to identify threats in real-time.24 Alternatively, individuals use verification when they need to prove their identity.25 This
technique is a part of everyday tasks, like unlocking a smartphone

Improve Electronic Data Security (“SHIELD”) Act, which includes biometric data in its
definition of PII. See S.B. S5575B, 2019–20 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); Philip Gordon &
Jennifer Taiwo, The New York SHIELD Act: What Employers Need to Know, SHRM (Aug.
28, 2019), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-localupdates/pages/new-york-shield-act.aspx [https://perma.cc/3H6J-UJTE].
16
See Our Technology, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/technology [https://perma.cc/
379Z-QNFC].
17
See How It Works, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/howitworks/ [https://
perma.cc/VYL3-QPRG].
18
See NEXIS Iris Scan Locations, U.S. IMMIGR. VISA & TRAVEL,
https://usa.immigrationvisaforms.com/travel/nexus-iris-scan-locations
[https://perma.cc/9CP9-AWZP].
19
Kim Porter, Biometrics and Biometric Data: What Is It and Is It Secure?, NORTON,
https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-iot-biometrics-how-do-they-work-are-theysafe.html [https://perma.cc/3HB8-GLY2].
20
See Stephen Mayhew, Explainer: Verification vs. Identification Systems, BIOMETRIC
UPDATE, https://www.biometricupdate.com/201206/explainer-verification-vs-identifica
tion-systems [https://perma.cc/UVK3-UD7H]; see also Biometrics: Authentication and
Identification—2020 Review, GEMALTO, https://www.gemalto.com/govt/inspired/
biometrics [https://perma.cc/R3Z6-AQH5].
21
Mayhew, supra note 20.
22
See id.
23
See id.
24
See id.
25
See id.
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using face unlock.26 Law enforcement also uses this method to
authenticate documents such as passports.27
Beyond identification and verification, entities can use biometric
data for a third purpose: classification. This use of facial recognition
is common; as facial recognition software scans a crowd, the
computer program measures characteristics such as spacing of the
eyes and bridge of the nose.28 The technology then uses these
characteristics to create a “digitally recorded representation” of
people’s facial features.29 These “faceprints” are then used to
determine certain characteristics such as gender and age.30
B. Use of Biometric Data in Sports Venues
1. Fingerprinting
MLB has pioneered biometric ticketing through the use of
fingerprinting. CLEAR, the “official biometric identity and
ticketing partner of the MLB,” operates special security clearance
checkpoints at thirteen of the thirty MLB ballparks.31 CLEAR lanes
expedite the check-in process by using fingerprints to identify
ticketed fans.32 CLEAR expanded its biometric ticketing to three
26

See What Is Facial Recognition on a Phone?, XFINITY DISCOVERY HUB (Jan. 31,
2019),
https://www.xfinity.com/hub/mobile/facial-recognition-on-phone
[https://perma.cc/H353-HZES].
27
See GEMALTO, supra note 20.
28
See Facial Recognition: Top 7 Trends, GEMALTO (last updated Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.gemalto.com/govt/biometrics/facial-recognition [https://perma.cc/KHW44UFP].
29
Faceprint,
COLLINS
DICTIONARY,
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/
dictionary/english/faceprint [https://perma.cc/FN7P-4RE5].
30
Id.; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, FACING FACTS: BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMON
USES OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHS. (Oct. 2012), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/reports/facing-facts-best-practices-common-uses-facial-recognitiontechnologies [https://perma.cc/9NZ5-DBU8] [hereinafter FTC, BEST PRACTICES].
31
See Sports, supra note 2; see also Alan Levin & Jonathan Levin, Sports Stadiums and
Arenas Increase High-Tech Security Tools, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 1, 2017, 10:01 AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/breaking/ct-stadium-security-spt-20170101story.html [https://perma.cc/VY2L-YCHD]. CLEAR is a biometric security platform that
operates expedited security checkpoints in over sixty airports, stadiums, and other venues
around the United States. See Where We Are, CLEAR, https://www.clearme.com/wherewe-are [https://perma.cc/8JYZ-CQHW].
32
See About Us, CLEAR, https://www.clearme.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/FEN73MPA].
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Major League Soccer arenas, two National Football League
(“NFL”) stadiums, and four National Basketball Association
arenas.33 CLEAR aims to provide “frictionless fan entry,”34 and,
according to its website, serves as a safe, simple, and secure
alternative to traditional paper ticketing.35
In the spectator sports market, CLEAR has higher aspirations
than just arena entry—it is expanding to concession sales.36 In 2018,
the Seattle Seahawks, Mariners, and Sounders FC implemented
CLEAR for concession purchases.37 Fingerprints serve as a means
both to pay and to verify age.38 The goal is to optimize time spent
watching the game and to reduce time spent waiting in lines39 by
“creat[ing] a fully walletless experience.”40 Seattle fans’ positive
reception of biometric concessions has laid the groundwork for
biometric concessions in stadiums around the country,41 starting
with the Mets’ Citi Field.42 Citi Field took this technology a step
further by opening a “Walk Thru Bru” store that eliminates the need
33

See Sports, supra note 2.
Stephen Mayhew, More MLB Stadiums Deploy CLEAR Biometric Tech for
Frictionless Fan Entry, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.biometric
update.com/201904/more-mlb-stadiums-deploy-clear-biometric-tech-for-frictionless-fanentry [https://perma.cc/4GP5-ZWDB].
35
See About Us, supra note 32.
36
See CLEAR Partners with Seattle Seahawks, supra note 6.
37
See id.
38
See CLEAR Adds Biometrics to Safeco Field Admissions, Concessions, BALLPARK
DIG. (Aug. 9, 2018), https://ballparkdigest.com/2018/08/09/clear-adds-biometrics-tosafeco-field-admissions-concessions/ [https://perma.cc/AA9U-RDZ7].
39
See id.
40
Joe Favorito, Getting a CLEAR Picture of Biometric Data in Sports Business, SPORTS
MARKETING & PR ROUNDUP (July 13, 2018), https://joefavorito.com/2018/07/13/gettinga-clear-picture-of-biometric-data-in-sports-business/ [https://perma.cc/8VMD-ZH6H].
41
See Jared Dubin, Seahawks Will Allow Fans to Buy Beer, Concessions Using Only
Their Fingerprint, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 7, 2018, 2:32 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/
nfl/news/seahawks-will-allow-fans-to-buy-beer-concessions-using-only-their-fingerprint/
[https://perma.cc/J9S2-99GP].
42
See Chris Burt, Clear to Provide Biometrics for Concessions Purchases at New York’s
Citi Field, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.biometricupdate.com/2019
09/clear-to-provide-biometrics-for-concessions-purchases-at-new-yorks-citi-field
[https://perma.cc/EJ96-BMLH]. Further, although currently CLEAR only uses
fingerprinting at sports venues, it has the capacity to use iris scans. CLEAR uses iris scans
in airports, which raises the possibility that it will expand this practice to stadiums and
arenas. See You Are the Best ID, CLEAR, https://www.clearme.com [https://
perma.cc/C238-GZWZ].
34
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for both wallets and cashiers.43 Fans select their items, place them
on an AI-powered self-checkout kiosk, and pay using CLEAR’s
fingerprinting machine.44 Additionally, the New York Jets, the San
Francisco 49ers, and Barclays Center (home of the Brooklyn Nets)
all partner with IDEMIA, the company behind TSA PreCheck.45
IDEMIA’s IdentoGO strives to use biometric data to provide “fast
pass”46 entrance for “trusted fans.”47
Biometric payment may seem like a recent phenomenon, but
companies have previously attempted to use biometric payment to
no avail. In 2002, Pay By Touch created a payment processing
system that combined biometric identification with electronic
financial transactions.48 Prominent public figures, including five
former NFL quarterbacks, funded the company.49 However,
frequent consumer misidentifications and false rejections undermined confidence in the technology.50 Thus, Pay By Touch’s efforts
never came to fruition, and the company declared bankruptcy in

43

Mets Add Self-Checkout Kiosk to Citi Field, supra note 4.
See id.
45
See Idemia to Bring TSA Pre✓ Services to Fenway Sports Group, BIG12FANATICS
(May 11, 2018), https://big12fanatics.com/idemia-to-bring-tsa-pre✓-services-to-fenwaysports-group/ [https://perma.cc/2PV8-3643]; IDEMIA to Bring Its IdentoGO Program to
Barclays Center, IDEMIA (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.idemia.com/press-release/idemiabring-its-identogo-program-barclays-center-2018-03-15 [https://perma.cc/5BXS-R2RB];
Draper, supra note 5. TSA PreCheck is a program that allows “low-risk” travelers to pass
through expedited security checkpoints when traveling through United States airports. The
U.S. Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security operates this program. The TSA conducts background checks of all applicants
before it grants them access to the program. Julia Kagan, TSA PreCheck, INVESTOPEDIA
(last updated Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tsa-pre.asp
[https://perma.cc/ER8Y-74VZ].
46
Idemia to Bring TSA Pre✓ Services to Fenway Sports Group, supra note 45.
47
Michael Loré, IdentoGO by IDEMIA Makes Your Game Day Experience Safer and
More Efficient, C ULTURE T RIP (Jan. 4, 2018), https://theculturetrip.com/northamerica/usa/articles/identogo-by-idemia-makes-your-game-day-experience-safer-andmore-efficient/ [https://perma.cc/MVE9-3NKW].
48
See Failure Story: What Happened to Pay By Touch?, MEDICI (Apr. 20, 2015),
https://gomedici.com/failure-story-what-happened-to-pay-by-touch
[https://perma.cc/P7WX-2CJP].
49
See id.
50
See id.
44
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2007.51 Over the past decade, biometric identification technology
has improved, and the idea of biometric payment has been revived.52
2. Facial Recognition
Though fingerprinting is a relatively new practice in the
spectator sports world, stadiums have used facial recognition as
early as the turn of the century.53 In 2001, the Raymond James
Stadium in Tampa Bay, Florida hosted Superbowl XXXV.54
Unbeknownst to spectators, the Tampa Police Department used a
surveillance system called FaceTrac to scan the crowds and identify
criminals and criminal suspects.55 Although the police department
did not arrest anybody, FaceTrac reported nineteen matches with its
criminal database.56 Though the police department’s intention of
providing optimal security for the fans may have been honorable,
many civilians were disconcerted to learn that the police had
effectively spied on them.57 The American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) contributed to the criticism of this “Orwellian” experiment by labeling the event the “Snooper Bowl.”58

51

See id.
For example, it is easier to capture high-quality face images as image sensors become
smaller and cheaper. See Anil K. Jain, Karthik Nandakumar & Arun Ross, 50 Years of
Biometric Research: Accomplishments, Challenges, and Opportunities, PATTERN
RECOGNITION LETTERS 79, 89–90 (Jan. 12, 2016).
53
See Super Bowl Snooping, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/
2001/02/04/opinion/super-bowl-snooping.html [https://perma.cc/MKN2-Z33F].
54
See Mary Huhn, Just a Face in the Crowd?—Superbowl Kicked Off the Use of Face
Recognition Software—But Is This an Invasion of Privacy?, N.Y. POST (June 26, 2001),
https://nypost.com/2001/06/26/just-a-face-in-the-crowd-superbowl-kicked-off-the-use-offace-recognition-software-but-is-this-an-invasion-of-privacy/
[https://perma.cc/DR948ULE].
55
See Super Bowl Snooping, supra note 53.
56
See Lev Grossman, Welcome to the Snooper Bowl, TIME (Feb. 4, 2001),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,98003,00.html
[https://perma.cc/9M2X-ND45].
57
See Dana Canedy, Tampa Scans the Faces in Its Crowds for Criminals, N.Y. TIMES
(July 4, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/04/us/tampa-scans-the-faces-in-itscrowds-for-criminals.html [https://perma.cc/6HXU-ZUER].
58
Grossman, supra note 56; see also Huhn, supra note 54.
52
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Despite this initial backlash, sporting arenas continue to use
facial recognition.59 For example, a handful of venues use this technology to improve security. Madison Square Garden, for instance,
installed crowd scanners at entrance security checkpoints.60 Additionally, the American Airlines Center in Dallas, Texas uses facial
recognition outside team locker rooms and throughout the arena.61
The Sacramento Kings’ Golden 1 Center’s practice facility uses
facial recognition for players and staff, but the arena has not yet
expanded this technology to spectators.62
As mentioned, use of facial recognition is not limited to identification—it also verifies people.63 For example, JetBlue recently
opened its first “e-gate” in the John F. Kennedy (“JFK”) airport in
Queens, New York.64 Instead of a boarding pass and passport,
travelers use their faces to board flights.65 U.S. Customs and Border
Protection operates this verification system.66 Once the system
verifies the traveler, it deletes the information from the system
within a few hours.67 Jet Blue’s JFK e-gate follows the example of
other airports, such as Atlanta, Georgia’s Hartsfield-Jackson Airport, where Delta operates an entire “biometric terminal.”68 Delta’s
biometric terminal uses facial recognition at check in, bag drop,

59

See Draper, supra note 5.
See id.
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
See Melissa Locker, Major League Baseball Tickets Are Going Biometric in 2019,
FAST CO. (July 12, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90201535/major-leaguebaseball-tickets-are-going-biometric-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/N5EK-CZRQ].
64
Geoffrey A. Fowler, Don’t Smile for Surveillance: Why Airport Face Scans Are a
Privacy Trap, WASH. POST (June 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2019/06/10/your-face-is-now-your-boarding-pass-thats-problem/
[https://perma.cc/D7QB-2UL7].
65
See id.
66
See Jummy Olabanji, ‘Very Unsettling’: Facial Recognition Technology at Airports
Sparks Privacy Concerns, NBC N.Y. (Apr. 24, 2019, 2:27 PM), https://www.nbc
newyork.com/news/local/Facial-Recognition-Technology-at-Airports-Sparks-PrivacyConcerns-508974851.html [https://perma.cc/6HMV-YGS5].
67
See id.
68
Fowler, supra note 64 (quoting Lori Aratani, Your Face Is Your Boarding Pass at
This Airport, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018, 2:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
nation/2018/12/04/your-face-is-your-boarding-pass-this-airport/ [https://perma.cc/9NUU37N5]).
60
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security, and boarding.69 While CLEAR’s fingerprint verification
currently dominates sports venue biometric ticketing, facial recognition ticketing is another viable possibility in this area.70
Sports stadiums could also be the next venue for Amazon’s “just
walk out technology.”71 Amazon is gradually creating a chain of
cashierless stores.72 To enter the store, customers scan the QR code
in their Amazon Go app.73 Then, cameras placed around the store
determine what items customers select and the app charges them as
they exit, which allows customers to forego checkout.74 Though
there were rumors that these cameras use facial recognition,75
Amazon denies this claim.76 Moreover, RBC Capital Markets
analysts estimate that cashierless stores bring in approximately 50%
more revenue than conventional stores.77 Amazon is not the first
company to use this technology—startups such as Zippin also
operate cashierless stores.78 Promising that automated checkout will
improve profit margins, these startups have already pitched their
technology to sports stadiums.79 These developments suggest that
cashierless, checkout-free concessions could soon become a reality
at sports stadiums throughout the United States.

69

See id.
See Locker, supra note 63.
71
Maggie Tillman, What Is Amazon Go, Where Is It, and How Does It Work?, POCKETLINT (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.pocket-lint.com/phones/news/amazon/139650-what-isamazon-go-where-is-it-and-how-does-it-work [https://perma.cc/F6XB-2VFL].
72
See Sebastian Herrera, Silicon Valley Takes on Amazon’s Cashierless ‘Go’ Stores,
WALL STREET J. (Oct. 14, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/silicon-valleytakes-on-amazons-cashierless-go-stores-11571045401 [https://perma.cc/VQ2B-F9BV].
73
See Tillman, supra note 71.
74
See id.
75
See id.
76
See Drew Harwell & Abha Battaral, Inside Amazon Go: The Camera-Filled
Convenience Store that Watches Your Back, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2019, 6:00 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/01/22/inside-amazon-go-thecamera-filled-convenience-store-that-watches-you-back/ [https://perma.cc/DF5U-L92W].
77
See Rani Molla, Amazon’s Cashierless Go Stores Could Be a $4 Billion Business by
2021, New Research Suggests, VOX (Jan. 4, 2019, 10:33 AM), https://www.vox.com/
2019/1/4/18166934/amazon-go-stores-revenue-estimates-cashierless
[https://perma.cc/KK5E-38TN].
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See Tillman, supra note 71.
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The startups also promised sports stadiums that automated checkout will reduce theft.
See Herrera, supra note 72.
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3. Market for User Data
Uses of biometric data in sports venues extend beyond security
and a frictionless spectator experience—there is also a market for
user data among vendors and advertisers. Every producer desires information about their consumers so as to better target advertisements and consequently generate business.80 While it is possible to
track the characteristics of initial ticket purchasers, that data
becomes moot once tickets enter the secondary market.81 Using
facial scanning even just to identify simple characteristics such as
the age and gender of spectators can profoundly impact the
advertisements shown at venues.82 Fancam, one of the largest
companies that sells this technology, states that collecting this data
can be used to attract sponsors and allow them to effectively plan
their advertisements.83 Teams such as the New York Rangers and
New England Patriots already use Fancam technology for advertising in their venues.84 Additionally, teams use facial recognition
technology to profile spectators to determine what music to play.85
For example, if the technology notes that the fans at a particular
game are younger and disproportionately female, the team can adjust the music accordingly.86 Further, if concession and merchandise
purchases are tracked using fingerprinting, vendors can target advertisements at consumers based on their purchase patterns.87 Facial
scanning can track a customer’s facial expressions when deciding
what concessions and merchandise to buy.88 This information about

80

See Draper, supra note 5.
See id.
82
See id. Age is detected by mapping out a series of facial points, such as corners of the
eyes and lips. These points are then run through an algorithm to determine that person’s
age. See Age Detection, ACTI, https://www.acti.com/technologies/age-detection
[https://perma.cc/9JYR-BMWG].
83
See Golden & Chemi, supra note 9.
84
See id.
85
See id.
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See id.
87
See Barry Levine, Viant Adds Purchase-Based Targeting for CPG Ads, MARTECH TODAY
(Aug. 22, 2018, 3:42 PM), https://martechtoday.com/viant-adds-purchase-based-targetingfor-cpg-ads-223129 [https://perma.cc/9HX5-RX9K].
88
See Elias Wright, The Future of Facial Recognition Is Not Fully Known: Developing
Privacy and Security Regulatory Mechanisms for Facial Recognition in the Retail Sector,
29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 632 (2019).
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consumer reactions could be just as important as actual purchases
when determining what to sell and how to advertise these products.89
Targeted advertisements are not a new phenomenon. Online
advertisers are able to collect data and target advertisements based
on individual consumer behavior.90 They base these advertisements
on a variety of data points including demographics and browsing
behavior.91 As technology advances, advertisers have the capacity
to extend targeted advertisements beyond the internet and into realtime.92 For example, beginning in 2012, Nomi Technologies used
media access control (“MAC”) addresses in mobile devices to track
customers in stores.93 This allowed Nomi to collect data points such
as the length of a customer’s stay in the store and whether or not that
customer had visited the store before.94 Biometric data can similarly
provide useful consumer data points. For example, purchase trends
and crowd demographics can be tracked using both fingerprints and
facial scanning.95 Then, teams can use this data to attract particular
advertisers,96 and the advertisers can use these data points to select
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See id.
See Rebecca Walker Reczek, Christopher Summers & Robert Smith, Targeted Ads
Don’t Just Make You More Likely to Buy—They Can Change How You Think About
Yourself, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/targeted-ads-dont-justmake-you-more-likely-to-buy-they-can-change-how-you-think-about-yourself
[https://perma.cc/WF67-GTRH].
91
See Cydney Hatch, How Targeted Advertising Works, DISRUPTIVE ADVERT. (Dec. 13,
2018), https://www.disruptiveadvertising.com/marketing/targeted-advertising/ [https://
perma.cc/DDV9-XVST]; Reczek, Summers & Smith, supra note 90.
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See Draper, supra note 5.
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See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Retail Tracking Firm Settles FTC Charges It
Misled Consumers About Opt Out Choices (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2015/04/retail-tracking-firm-settles-ftc-charges-it-misledconsumers [https://perma.cc/5FVE-NYEF] [hereinafter FTC Press Release 2015].
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See id. However, not everybody viewed Nomi’s services favorably. The FTC charged
Nomi with misleading consumers by promising opt-out mechanisms in stores. The FTC
and Nomi reached a settlement in 2015, agreeing that Nomi was prohibited from future
misrepresentations. See id.
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See Golden & Chemi, supra note 9.
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the best advertisements for that event’s unique crowd.97 Since effective advertising increases profit, access to this data is invaluable.98
II. SHOULD SOMEBODY INTERVENE?
Biometric data’s “unique, permanent” nature and ability to
identify, verify, and classify individuals have many advantages in
sports venues, but this technology also raises numerous concerns.99
Biometric identifiers can reduce time spent waiting in lines, provide
heightened security, and enable a customized experience. However,
biometric identifiers are personal metrics susceptible to deceitful or
unfair trade practices,100 and breaches of biometric data can have
sobering implications.101 Additionally, recent studies have revealed
the inaccuracies of facial recognition.102 Part II.A details how this
technology can improve the sport spectator experience, while Part
II.B addresses the threats that could result from unregulated use of
biometric data.
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Stores such as Target have experimented with using biometric data for advertising
purposes. Some stores have even merged their security and advertising departments since
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[https://perma.cc/V2TG-VVC2].
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See Jeremy Bradley, The Impact of Advertising & Sales Promotion in Revenue,
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/impact-advertising-sales-promotion-revenueCHRON,
59840.html [https://perma.cc/UX8X-6LLY]. Many news sources describe data as “the oil
of the digital era.” The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, But Data,
ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worldsmost-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/8L5K-RBHT]; see
also Gabriel J.X. Dance, Michael LaForgia, & Nicholas Confessore, As Facebook Raised
a Privacy Wall, It Carved an Opening for Tech Giants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/technology/facebook-privacy.html
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A. Benefits of Biometric Data in Sports Venues
1. Biometrics Increase Spectator Convenience
The Seattle Mariners boast that using CLEAR’s biometric
products maximizes the amount of time that fans spend in their seats
and minimizes the amount of time that fans spend waiting in lines.103
CLEAR advertises frictionless entry,104 and IDEMIA promotes its
fast-pass entrance at Barclays Center in Brooklyn, New York.105
Without wallets, fans do not fumble for tickets, credit cards, or
IDs.106 Further, while fans can forget to bring these items, they
cannot forget to bring their biometric traits.107 These identifiers are
intrinsic in every human; thus, using biometric identifiers eliminates
the need to remember multiple items, such as tickets and credit
cards, just to attend a game.108 Walletless lines also reduce the
burden on the venue’s gate staff.109 Overall, biometric ticketing and
concessions minimize the long lines traditionally characteristic of
attending a sporting event.
2. Biometric Technology Promotes Safety and Security
Private security companies and law enforcement are increasing
their use of biometric data. For example, in 2018, police used DNA
from a genealogy database to close a four-decades-old investigation.110 The investigators used DNA to piece together a family tree

103
See CLEAR Adds Biometrics to Safeco Field Admissions, Concessions, supra note 38
(interviewing the Mariners’ Senior Vice President of Baseball Operations, Trevor Gooby).
104
See CLEAR Adds Biometrics to Safeco Field Admissions, Concessions, supra note 38
(interviewing CLEAR CEO Caryn Seidman Becker).
105
See Idemia to Bring TSA Pre✓ Services to Fenway Sports Group, supra note 45.
106
See generally Dubin, supra note 41.
107
See Porter, supra note 19.
108
See id.
109
See David Broughton, NYC Biometric Security Firm Helps Sports Venues Speed Fans
Through Gates, N.Y. BUS. J., (Dec. 1, 2017, 12:12 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/
newyork/news/2017/12/01/nyc-biometric-security-firm-helps-sports-venues.html
[https://perma.cc/6NNR-7UG8].
110
See Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged Golden State Killer, Investigators First Found
His Great-Great-Great-Grandparents, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/to-find-alleged-golden-state-killer-investigatorsfirst-found-his-great-great-great-grandparents/2018/04/30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0e-b6b20bec548d501f_story.html [https://perma.cc/7VS5-HL2H].
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and arrest a notorious burglar, rapist, and murderer nicknamed the
Golden State Killer.111 In addition to DNA, law enforcement officers across the country are using facial recognition technology to
solve crimes thought to have gone cold.112 For example, the police
recently caught an attempted murderer in Central Indiana with
the aid of facial recognition.113 Clare Garvie, a scholar from the
Georgetown Law Center on Privacy & Technology, relied on
internal police documents to determine that from 2010 through
2016, facial recognition technology assisted police in arresting over
2,800 people.114 This technology is also used internationally. In
2018, Iraqi authorities used fingerprints and facial data to identify
“three high-level terrorist suspects.”115 Similar technology is utilized at arenas to increase security at sporting events.
Sports venues employ facial recognition to identify criminals
and criminal suspects. For example, in 2018, facial recognition
technology in the Nanchang International Sports Center in Jiangxi
province, China led to the arrest of a suspect wanted by the police.116
Additionally, heavily populated venues are prominent targets for
shooters and terrorists.117 In an era of frequent shootings and
111

See id.
See Julie Bosman & Serge. F. Kovaleski, Facial Recognition: Dawn of Dystopia, or
Just the New Fingerprint?, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/05/18/us/facial-recognition-police.html [https://perma.cc/Q2N7-VH3D].
113
See id.
114
Id.
115
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https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Identifying-terrorist-suspects
[https://perma.cc/9ATK-EEJ5].
116
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Facial-Recognition Cameras Caught Him, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2018, 3:25 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/13/china-crime-facialrecognition-cameras-catch-suspect-at-concert-with-60000-people/
[https://perma.cc/5SB8-QXGN].
117
See JOHN D. WOODWARD, JR., SUPERBOWL SURVEILLANCE: FACING UP TO BIOMETRICS
3 (RAND 2001). Some notable examples include the bombing at Ariana Grande’s concert
at the Manchester Arena in London, England, the shooting at the Route 51 Harvest festival
in Las Vegas, Nevada, and the bombings at the 1996 Summer Olympics at Centennial
Olympic Park in Atlanta, Georgia. See Ariana Grande Breaks Down Talking About
Manchester Arena Attack, BBC (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat45239228 [https://perma.cc/LZG6-QRD8]; Andrew Blankstein, Pete Williams, Rachel
Elbaum & Elizabeth Chuck, Las Vegas Shooting: 59 Killed and More Than 500 Hurt Near
Mandalay Bay, NBC NEWS (last updated Oct. 2, 2017, 10:33 PM),
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terrorist attacks, effective security measures at public venues are of
paramount importance.118 Facial recognition systems help minimize
security risks by scanning crowds to identify criminals and criminal
suspects before an attack occurs.119
These systems also capture smaller-scale criminals, such as merchandise thieves.120 Facial recognition systems serve as advanced
surveillance systems that can both document the theft and identify
the culprit.121 Many retail stores already use facial recognition to
prevent shoplifting.122 FaceFirst, a facial recognition software
company,123 states that it reduced retailer losses by up to 34% and
in-store violence by up to 91%.124 Even if no crimes are actually
committed, knowledge that a venue uses a facial recognition system
by itself could deter would-be lawbreakers from committing crimes,
especially if venues actively notify attendees that facial recognition
technology is being utilized.125

https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/las-vegas-shooting/las-vegas-police-investigatingshooting-mandalay-bay-n806461 [https://perma.cc/6RRT-SM94]; Olympic Park Bombing
Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/us/olympic-parkbombing-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/TEC3-9GHP].
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Jesse Davis West, 3 Ways That Face Recognition Will Impact Future Retail Stores in
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Further, venues use facial recognition to identify, eject, and
ban unruly fans. Incidents warranting eviction range from pouring
beers to throwing punches at other spectators.126 Thus, keeping
these problematic fans out of the stadium can not only improve
the spectator experience, but also keep fans safe. Violence is a
proven issue for teams such as the San Francisco 49ers. In a single
season, over two hundred fights and twenty-three felony arrests
occurred at home games.127 Teams such as Danish football club
Brondby IF report success stories of using facial recognition technology to keep “blacklist[ed]” fans out of their stadium.128 Prior to
implementing this system, Brondby used printed photographs of
banned fans, a system they described as “very, very difficult” and
“not very efficient.”129
Additionally, biometric identifiers are an efficient, convenient,
and secure method of verification.130 These identifiers authenticate
spectators at record speed.131 Further, since traits like fingerprints
are intrinsic in every individual, they cannot be stolen or lost like an
ID card, or forgotten132 or guessed like a password.133 According to
Verizon, hackers who stole or uncovered weak passwords accounted
for 81% of data breaches in 2016.134 Alternatively, biometric data
126

See Dave Sheinin & Mike Hume, When Fans Get Banned for Life From Sports
Stadiums, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2016, 1:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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129
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130
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131
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Convenience, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016, 3:21 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfor
debate/2016/07/05/biometrics-and-banking/biometrics-allow-for-better-bank-securityand-customer-convenience [https://perma.cc/69RT-HMC3].
132
See Tracy V. Wilson, How Biometrics Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, https://science.
howstuffworks.com/biometrics.htm [https://perma.cc/542H-VC69].
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See Biometrics Offers Advantages and Controversy, supra note 130.
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See Fahmida Y. Rashid, Annual Verizon Security Report Says Sloppiness Causes Most
Data Breaches, INFOWORLD (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.infoworld.com/article/
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is much more difficult to recreate.135 Using biometric data can
improve security for venues as a whole, as well as for
individual spectators.
3. Use of Biometric Data Creates a Customized Spectator
Experience and Promotes Innovation
New technology inspires innovation. Many fans today believe
that high-quality television and internet access make watching
games at home more enjoyable than watching games live.136 In
response, sporting venues have sought to leverage technology to
entice fans to come back to the venue.137 Rapid technological
advancement leads fans to expect digital, convenient customer
service.138 Thus, venues created the “Smart Stadium.”139 These stadiums provide a spectator experience centered around technology.140 For example, many stadiums have phone applications
(“apps”) that boast a variety of functions, which include directing
fans to the shortest lines and providing access to instant replays.141
Further, teams and sponsors can interact with fans on social
media.142 In addition to apps, Smart Stadiums use digital signs at
concession stands that rotate content, including to announce when a
fresh batch of food is ready.143 Smart Stadiums also partner with

135

See Olivia Solon, The End of Passwords: Biometrics Are Coming But Do Risks
Outweigh Benefits?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
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136
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137
See id.
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advertisers to run personalized, real-time advertisement campaigns.144 These intelligent stadiums can also generate reports and
determine the success of particular advertisements.145
Biometrics can take the personalized fan experience to the next
level. Merchants can use faceprints to track what a fan purchases—
i.e., a certain drink or type of clothing146—and then use that information to display “hyper-personalized” advertisements.147 While
the technology is not fully developed, many technology companies
envision a future that integrates biometric data into advertisements
at venues. For example, “in the not-too-distant” future, facial recognition devices will identify fans individually as they enter the
venue.148 If the device recognizes the attendee as a returning fan, the
venue will already know that person’s food preferences and can
offer free food or similar perks tailored to that specific individual.149
Technology companies such as Fancam are already able to determine how much attention fans pay to digital advertisements.150
Knowing what time during the game and which advertisements
attract the most attention can assist venues when selling advertisement space.151 Further, having more information about potential
144

See Smart Connected Stadiums Smart Venues, Revolutionary Experiences, supra note

136.
145

See id. Yet, advertisements can only be personalized within the constraints of the
stadium design. For example, every spectator sees the same jumbotron and thus the same
advertisements.
146
See Matthew Hastings, The Future of Biometrics: Identifying Target Markets at the
Source, AVER (Oct. 18, 2018), http://www.aver.com/AVerExpert/biotmetrics-targetingthe-market-at-the-source [https://perma.cc/882C-FFA2].
147
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148
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consumers enhances customer service.152 Thus, in addition to benefiting advertisers, targeted advertisements benefit fans by guiding
them to products they are more likely to enjoy.153
B. The Risks of Unregulated Use of Biometric Data
1. Recovery from Security Breaches Could Be Unattainable
The prevalence of security breaches and identity theft has
grave consequences. Breaches expose personal identifiers such as
addresses and phone numbers, as well as access to passwordprotected sites and bank accounts.154 In the past two years alone,
major breaches included Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scandal,
the Marriott hack, the Equifax hack, the Capital One breach, and the
discovery of unencrypted MoviePass records.155 Yet many of these
breaches can be remedied. Individuals can change passwords,
replace credit cards, and thereby recover security.156 However, after
a biometric data breach, affected individuals cannot similarly
recover their stolen biological data nor remedy the breach because
there is no way to replace such data.
When it comes to security, the unique and unchangeable nature
of biometric identifiers is a double-edged sword.157 On the plus side,
these permanent characteristics preclude biometric identifiers from
being forgotten, stolen,158 or guessed like a password.159 Yet, just
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like all other forms of data on the internet, biometric information is
still “vulnerable to international cybersecurity attacks.”160
In August 2019, Biostar 2 suffered a massive breach of twentythree gigabytes of data consisting of over thirty million records.161
The records included standard data such as passwords and
photographs, as well as biometric data such as facial recognition
information and over a million fingerprints.162 This breach was both
quantitatively and geographically massive. Biostar 2 is a web-based
biometric lock system that uses fingerprints and facial recognition
to identify people trying to gain access to buildings.163 Suprema, a
“global Powerhouse in biometrics, security and identity solutions,”
owns Biostar 2.164 Entities such as the United Kingdom metropolitan police, defense contractors, and banks all use Suprema.165
Biostar 2 had recently merged with another security company,
AEOS, which 5,700 companies across eighty-three countries use.166
Biostar 2’s breach is particularly concerning because, “unlike
passwords being leaked, when fingerprints are leaked, you can’t
change your fingerprint.”167 One of the hackers commented that
“biometric information such as fingerprints could never be made
private again once lost.”168 Though recovering from standard
data breaches and identity theft is not trivial, biometric data’s
irreplaceable nature heightens security concerns. Overall, Biostar 2
has a widespread database, and the consequences of this breach,
160

Id. at 20.
See Chris Baraniuk, Biostar Security Software ‘Leaked a Million Fingerprints’, BBC
(Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49343774 [https://perma.cc/
4PAX-2DG4].
162
See id.
163
See Josh Taylor, Major Breach Found in Biometrics System Used by Banks, UK
Police and Defence Firms, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2019, 3:11 AM), https://www.
theguardian.com/technology/2019/aug/14/major-breach-found-in-biometrics-systemused-by-banks-uk-police-and-defence-firms [https://perma.cc/M3Q5-XQYR].
164
Zak Doffman, New Data Breach Has Exposed Millions Of Fingerprint And Facial
Recognition Records: Report, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2019, 4:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/14/new-data-breach-has-exposed-millions-of-fingerprint-andfacial-recognition-records-report/ [https://perma.cc/FWE3-MTJ4].
165
See id.
166
See id.
167
Taylor, supra note 163.
168
Baraniuk, supra note 161.
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while still unclear, could be disastrous. Criminal activities stemming
from this data could irreparably harm not only companies, but also
their employees and clients.169 Once a hacker has access to this
irreplaceable data, individuals cannot regain their exclusive control
over their biometric identities. Thus, this breach could lead to
unbounded identity theft.
2. Inaccuracies in Facial Recognition
Recent studies illuminate another problem with biometrics: the
high rates of inaccuracy in facial recognition. On October 21, 2019,
the ACLU of Massachusetts published results from a study that used
Amazon’s Rekognition facial recognition software to run the faces
of 188 professional athletes from the Boston Celtics, Boston Bruins,
Boston Red Sox, and the New England Patriots against a database
of public arrest photos.170 The technology incorrectly identified
twenty-seven of these athletes as criminals.171 The ACLU of
California conducted a similar study which revealed that inaccuracies skewed towards certain demographics—namely, women and
people of color.172
Other studies show similar results.173 For example, test results
from July 2019 revealed that Idemia’s algorithms are more likely to

169

See id.
See Facial Recognition Technology Falsely Identifies Famous Athletes, ACLU MASS.
(Oct. 21, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.aclum.org/en/news/facial-recognition-technologyfalsely-identifies-famous-athletes [https://perma.cc/D6BS-VKD5]. This test was part of
the ACLU of Massachusetts’ “Press Pause on Face Surveillance” campaign. Id.
171
See id.
172
See id. Though this Note will not discuss it, inaccuracies in facial recognition
technology can also amplify bias. For example, the Electronic Privacy Information Center
alleges that recruiting technology company HireVue’s face-scanning software is biased by
race and gender. See Ben Kochman, FTC Should Probe AI Screening Co. HireVue,
Advocates Say, LAW360 (Nov. 7, 2019, 8:40 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1217648/ftc-should-probe-ai-screening-co-hirevue-advocates-say
[https://perma.cc/LZQ3-YFJE].
173
See Larry Hardesty, Study Finds Gender and Skin-Type Bias in Commercial ArtificialIntelligence Systems, MIT NEWS (Feb. 11, 2018), https://news.mit.edu/2018/study-findsgender-skin-type-bias-artificial-intelligence-systems-0212 [https://perma.cc/R65N-57KL]
(noting that three programs produced 0.8% error rates for light-skinned men, but error rates
ranging from 20% to over 34% for dark-skinned women); see also Tom Simonite, The Best
Algorithms Struggle to Recognize Black Faces Equally, WIRED (July 22, 2019, 7:00 AM),
170
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misidentify black women’s faces than any other gender and
race combination.174 These findings are problematic for both commercial and security uses of facial recognition. Advertisers cannot
properly target advertisements and security forces cannot correctly
identify criminals if facial recognition does not accurately identify
individuals. Further, a fan’s entire gameday experience can be
ruined if he is barred from entering a stadium after security incorrectly identifies him as being on the venue’s blacklist. Thus, inaccurate facial recognition technology has the potential to adversely
affect a fan’s experience at a game from the time he or she arrives
at the venue to the time he or she leaves.
3. Biometric Data is Inherently Private
Biometric technology has a history of infringing on personal
data. In 2012, San Francisco tech startup SceneTap planned to use
basic facial identification such as jaw and skeletal structure to
identify the age and gender of people at bars.175 SceneTap would
then share this information with potential guests so they would know
the scene at the bar before they arrived.176 Chief Executive Officer
Cole Harper did not view SceneTap as facial recognition but rather
“facial detection.”177 He stated that the software was not invasive
because it only classified people by age and gender.178 Yet that
explanation did not satisfy wary San Francisco residents.179

https://www.wired.com/story/best-algorithms-struggle-recognize-black-faces-equally/
[https://perma.cc/VTT2-4ASZ].
174
See Simonite, supra note 173.
175
See Violet Blue, San Francisco Hates Your Startup: SceneTap, ZDNET (May 15,
2012, 9:50 AM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/san-francisco-hates-your-startupscenetap/ [https://perma.cc/6GMX-6RSZ].
176
See Adi Robertson, SceneTap Cameras Hit San Francisco Bars, Use Facial
Recognition to Find Parties and Privacy Concerns, VERGE (May 15, 2012 10:33 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2012/5/15/3021628/scenetap-face-detecting-camera-sanfrancisco-bar-launch [https://perma.cc/KB5R-J38A].
177
Paula Forbes, Creepy SceneTap App CEO Insists It’s Not Creepy at All, EATER (May
21, 2012, 10:45 AM), https://www.eater.com/2012/5/21/6584743/creepy-scenetap-appceo-insists-its-not-creepy-at-all [https://perma.cc/5X56-TPBG].
178
See id.
179
See Blue, supra note 175.
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Civilians criticized SceneTap’s privacy implications, and the
company fizzled out of existence.180
Health insurance company Vitality’s use of biometric data also
raises privacy concerns. Vitality partners with wearable technology
brands to promote a healthy lifestyle for its customers.181 The company is unique in that it aims to pay for its customers’ wellness, not
sickness.182 Vitality offers incentives for healthy behavior, which it
tracks through wearable technology such as Apple Watches.183 First,
each member receives an Apple Watch for an initial activation fee
and tax.184 Then, the amount that member actually pays for the
watch depends on how many workouts the member completes per
month.185 Additional rewards include discounts on healthy food.186
Insurance company John Hancock has fully embraced Vitality;187 in
2015, John Hancock started offering the option to add Vitality to its
life insurance policies.188 On September 19, 2018, after observing
“remarkable results,” such as a 30% decrease in hospitalization costs
of Vitality policyholders, John Hancock announced that all of its life
insurance policies would come with Vitality.189 While the intent to
promote wellness is noble, biometric data such as blood pressure

180

See id.
See Bernard Marr, This Health Insurance Company Tracks Customers’ Exercise and
Eating Habits Using Big Data and IoT, FORBES (May 27, 2019 12:22 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2019/05/27/this-health-insurance-companytracks-customers-exercise-and-eating-habits-using-big-data-and-iot/#2bd96cbd6ef3
[https://perma.cc/PNN5-ULPL].
182
See id.
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See Active Rewards with Apple Watch, VITALITY, https://www.vitalitygroup.com/thevitality-difference/active-rewards-apple-watch/ [https://perma.cc/4FCR-ENLN].
184
See id.
185
See id.
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See MARCO HAFNER, JACK POLLARD & CHRISTIAN VAN STOLK, INCENTIVES AND
PHYSICAL ACTIVITY iv (RAND 2018).
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See John Hancock, John Hancock Leaves Traditional Life Insurance Model Behind
to Incentivize Longer, Healthier Lives, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 19, 2018, 9:10 AM),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/john-hancock-leaves-traditional-lifeinsurance-model-behind-to-incentivize-longer-healthier-lives-300715351.html
[https://perma.cc/6CB5-4M24].
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and cholesterol levels are private metrics that many people would
prefer to keep private.190
Similar privacy concerns arise when using facial recognition at
sports venues.191 Because many people covet their anonymity, the
thought of venues using persistent identifiers such as fingerprints
and facial recognition to track fans’ entire spectator experience is
chilling.192 Entrances using fingerprints reveal who attends the
game, concessions using fingerprints for purchases reveal what fans
are consuming, and facial recognition throughout the stadium reveals spectators’ every move.193 The potential for a breach to cause
irremediable repercussions raises strong concerns about venues possessing such extensive, personal data about their attendees.194
4. The Risk of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
Use of biometric data may be an unfair or deceptive trade
practice. Section 45 of the Federal Trade Act codifies the illegality
of unfair and deceptive trade practices. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) defines deceptive practices as those
“involving a material representation, omission or practice that is

190

See Marr, supra note 181.
Though this Note will not discuss it in depth, there are also Fourth Amendment
concerns with the use of biometric data at sports venues. These concerns revolve around
“an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy,” as addressed in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967). See Roberto Iraola, New Detection Technologies and the
Fourth Amendment, 47 S.D. L. REV. 8, 16 (2002). Courts have discussed similar Fourth
Amendment concerns regarding non-biometric technology as well. See Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (holding that unrestricted access to cell-site records is
not permitted by the Fourth Amendment).
192
See Daniel Susser, Notice After Notice-and-Consent: Why Privacy Disclosures Are
Valuable Even If Consent Frameworks Aren’t, 9 J. INFO. POL’Y 37, 50 (2019).
193
In addition to the chilling effect of this intrusion of privacy, capturing biometric data
could raise problems under the common law right to privacy. This right prohibits
appropriation of a person’s likeness. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A, C
(AM. LAW. INST. 1977). The Northern District of Illinois mentioned in dicta that using
biometric data gathered from photographs to target advertisements could be an
appropriation of one’s likeness. See Rivera v. Google, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1014
(N.D. Ill. 2018).
194
See supra Part II.B.1.
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likely to mislead a customer acting reasonably in the circumstances.”195 The Commission describes an act or practice as unfair
if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoidable by the customers themselves and
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.”196 Once the FTC believes that an entity has violated
15 U.S.C. § 45, the FTC can issue a complaint charging that entity
with an unfair or deceptive trade practice.197 This complaint can be
pursued through administrative or judicial enforcement.198
Sports arenas and biometric technology companies may claim
that expedited lines,199 the potential for heightened security,200 and
the customized spectator experience201 outweigh the privacy202
and data protection concerns of collecting biometric data.203
However, the unchangeable, irreplaceable nature of biometric characteristics204 and the inaccuracies associated with facial recognition
technology205 create too great a likelihood that spectators will suffer
substantial injury. Short of opting out of having their data collected,
an option that venues do not currently offer, spectators cannot
reasonably avoid these harms.
Given the associated security and privacy implications that
accompany the technology, it is likely that at least some spectators
would want to opt out of participating in biometric identification.
It is not challenging to offer entrances or concession booths without
fingerprinting. However, if a venue uses facial scanning technology,
it would be near impossible to have individual people opt in or
out. Instead, at a minimum, stadiums could disclose use of facial
195

A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement,
and Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N (last revised Oct. 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority
[https://perma.cc/U7ET-8MF5].
196
Id.
197
See id.
198
See id.
199
See supra Part II.A.1.
200
See supra Part II.A.2.
201
See supra Part II.A.3.
202
See supra Part II.B.3.
203
See supra Part II.B.1.
204
See supra Part II.B.1.
205
See supra Part II.B.2.
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recognition on their website. Further, a solution many venues
already employ is adding a contract to all tickets purchased.206
However, online notice and ticket contracts could raise issues of
unfair and deceptive trade practices and contracts of adhesion, as
discussed further below.
A recent example of a technology-based deceptive trade practice
is the FTC’s settlement with Nomi Technologies. In 2015, the FTC
found Nomi’s promise of an in-store opt-out from its mobile
tracking technology deceptive.207 This practice was deceptive
because, in fact, there was no way to opt-out in the stores; consumers
could only opt-out online.208 The FTC charged Nomi with misleading consumers, and the 2015 settlement prohibited Nomi from
future misrepresentations.209 This case forewarns spectator-sport
venues of the repercussions that could result from misrepresenting
opt-out clauses in their technology-use policies.
Additionally, contracts on tickets could be considered adhesion
contracts. An adhesion contract is a “standard-form contract[]” that
deprives an individual of bargaining power.210 These contracts
“introduce[] the serpent of uncertainty into the Eden of contract
enforcement” by preventing the assurance of a “manifestation of
the parties’ intent.”211 Generally, large companies present these
contracts to individuals on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.212 Courts
typically uphold these contracts unless the company uses “high
pressure tactics,” “deceptive language,” or the contract is unconscionable.213 The language of the ticket contract could be deceptive,214 and not allowing somebody into the stadium unless they

206

See Golden & Chemi, supra note 9. These contracts also claim rights to spectators’
likeness. See id.
207
See FTC Press Release 2015, supra note 93.
208
See id.
209
See id.
210
Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Edwin W. Patterson, The
Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919).
211
Klos, 133 F.3d at 168.
212
Id. (internal citations omitted).
213
Id.; see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991).
214
For example, the FTC charged Nomi with deceptive trade practice when Nomi
misrepresented to consumers its in-store notice policy. See Complaint at 3, In the Matter
of Nomi Techs., Inc., Docket No. C-4538 (F.T.C. Sept. 3, 2015).
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agree to the terms allowing the use of their biometric data could be
a “high pressure tactic.” As for the third exception, courts have not
yet determined whether capture, use, or dissemination of biometric
data is unconscionable. However, scholars have addressed concerns
about this ethical dilemma, particularly relating to Facebook’s use
of facial recognition for photograph tagging.215 One scholar opines
that Facebook’s one-sided terms and conditions that permit use of
facial recognition technology impose an “unreasonable and unfair”
risk to users.216 Despite this concern, privacy issues are not typically
addressed through contract law; instead, they are usually regulated
by the FTC.217 Part III.B.2 will discuss the FTC’s stance on the use
of biometric data.
III. OPTIONS FOR REGULATING BIOMETRIC DATA
There is no national law in the United States regulating the
use of biometric data. However, there are federal best practice
guidelines in place. Additionally, several states have already enacted
biometric privacy laws and some states have similar laws pending.
There is also an EU statute governing the use of biometric data.
These statutes and guidelines could provide a basis for a statute
or regulation that would apply to sports venues. This Part will
first address if using biometric data in sports venues should be
regulated at all. Then, it will discuss the components of the current
and proposed biometric regulations that could be applied to
sports venues.
A. No Regulation
Allowing unrestricted use of biometric data in stadiums and
arenas invites opportunities for increased spectator convenience and
amplified security.218 Lines will move quicker,219 tickets cannot be
215

See Rosie Brinckerhoff, Social Network or Social Nightmare: How California Courts
Can Prevent Facebook’s Frightening Foray into Facial Recognition Technology from
Haunting Consumer Privacy Rights Forever, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 105, 116 (2018).
216
Id.
217
See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586 (2014).
218
See supra Part II.A.
219
See CLEAR Adds Biometrics to Safeco Field Admissions, Concessions, supra note 38.
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lost,220 advertisements will reach their optimal audience,221 and fans
will maximize the amount of time they spend watching the game.222
Yet at this point in biometric technology’s development, there is a
shocking lack of empirical evidence to support these claims. They
sound logical based on the personal, identifiable nature of biometrics, but it may be too soon to tell if these ambitious utilities will
translate into reality. Additionally, spectators may be reluctant to
relinquish control of their privacy for these alleged benefits.223
Even if spectators are willing to concede their data, they might
be concerned about being misidentified due to the known
inaccuracies of facial recognition technology.224 Thus, it may be
most advantageous to compromise and permit the use of biometric
data conditioned on regulations. As mentioned above and expanded
upon below, there is currently no nationwide regulation that applies
to the use of biometric data in sports venues.225 The FTC issued
guidelines for use of facial recognition, yet only a few states have
statutes in place.226 As these few frameworks suggest, biometric
regulations should focus on transparency, security exceptions,
data protection, deletion, and remedies for when entities breach
these regulations.227
B. Current Biometric Regulations and Propositions
1. Moratorium
Recently, many organizations and scholars have advocated for a
moratorium on the use of facial recognition. The ACLU criticized
the use of facial recognition as early as the 2001 Super Bowl, and
its disdain for this technology has not dwindled.228 In June 2019, the
ACLU piloted an effort to encourage Congress to place a federal

220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

See Favorito, supra note 40.
See Draper, supra note 5.
See CLEAR Adds Biometrics to Safeco Field Admissions, Concessions, supra note 38.
See supra Part II.B.3.
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See infra Part III.B.2.b.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See Grossman, supra note 56.
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moratorium on facial recognition for law enforcement.229 In its letter, the ACLU emphasized how federal agencies use facial recognition technology “largely in secret,” despite the fact that neither the
federal nor state legislatures explicitly authorize law enforcement to
use this technology.230 Moreover, the ACLU’s letter highlighted
evidence of inaccuracy with this technology; namely, that the technology erroneously identifies women of color 30% of the time.231
Thus, the ACLU requested that the U.S. House and Oversight
Reform Committee place a moratorium on face recognition technology until Congress decides what uses should be permitted.232
The New York State Assembly seems to agree with the ACLU’s
stance. On June 20, 2019, just weeks after the ACLU sent its letter,
the New York State Assembly passed a bill that prohibits the use
of biometric identifiers in New York schools until July 1, 2022.233
The bill directs the State Department of Education’s chief privacy
officer to study and recommend to the legislature which uses of
biometric technology are appropriate and, if any, “what restrictions
and guidelines should be enacted to protect individual privacy
interests.”234 The bill highlights particular issues that the privacy
229

See Letter from The American Civil Liberties Union, et al., to The Honorable Elijah
Cummings, Chairman of the U.S. House Oversight and Reform Comm., the Honorable Jim
Jordan, Ranking Member of the U.S. House Oversight and Reform Comm. (June 3, 2019)
[hereinafter Letter from ACLU]. The ACLU asked for this moratorium to apply to
immigration enforcement as well. Sixty groups accompanied the ACLU in signing this
letter.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
See id. The ACLU also commenced a suit on October 31, 2019, against the U.S.
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement
Administration for failing to produce public records relating to use of biometric data, as is
required under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552). See Complaint, ACLU
v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. 1:19-cv-12242 (D. Mass. Oct. 31, 2019), ECF No. 1;
Chris Villani, ACLU Sues Feds Seeking Info on Facial Recognition Tech, LAW360 (Oct.
31, 2019, 4:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1215653/aclu-sues-feds-seekinginfo-on-facial-recognition-tech [https://perma.cc/2T4D-QYD2].
233
See Annie McDonough, School Facial Recognition Pause Passed in Assembly, CITY
& ST. N.Y. (June 21, 2019), https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/policy/technology/
school-facial-recognition-pause-passed-in-assembly.html
[https://perma.cc/URN6J9WH]. This bill is possibly a response to the Lockport City School District’s move
towards implementing a facial recognition security system.
234
N.Y. Legis. Assemb. A06787 § 2-e(2)(a), Reg. Sess. 2019–20 (N.Y. 2019). The New
York City Council also demonstrated concern about the use of biometric data in housing.
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officer should consider, including the privacy implications, security
uses, risk of false identifications, length of time the data should be
stored, risks of breach, and processes for schools to notify the public
that they are using biometric identifiers.235 The New York Senate
recessed for the year before determining whether to pass this bill.236
The bill’s sponsor expects the Senate to “take it up again” during the
next session.237
Scholars such as Evan Selinger238 and Woodrow Hartzog239
support a ban on facial recognition.240 They opine that use of facial

Council Member Brad Lander proposed the Keep Entry to Your Home Surveillance-free
Act (“KEYS”) to prohibit landlords from mandating use of technology-based keys and
surveillance of buildings. See New York City Council Legislation Would Protect Tenants
From Racial Recognition & “Smart” Key Surveillance, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://council.nyc.gov/brad-lander/2019/10/07/new-city-council-legislation-wouldprotect-tenants-from-facial-recognition-smart-key-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/7NCSUZ7L]. Senator Cory Booker proposed a similar bill, the No Biometric Barriers to Housing
Act, that would ban the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development from using
facial recognition in public housing. See Anthony Kimery, Sen. Booker Latest to Propose
Regulating Government’s Use of Biometrics, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.biometricupdate.com/201911/sen-booker-latest-to-propose-regulatinggovernments-use-of-biometrics [https://perma.cc/S3T3-UUKR].
235
See N.Y. Legis. Assemb. A06787 § 2-e(2)(a).
236
See Ryan Whalen, Wallace’s Facial Recognition Moratorium Didn’t Pass, But She’s
Asking NYSED to Do It Anyway, SPECTRUM NEWS (July 16, 2019, 4:51 PM),
https://spectrumlocalnews.com/nys/central-ny/politics/2019/07/16/facial-recognitionsoftware [https://perma.cc/98N5-EPJX].
237
Id. Without a state-wide ban, Lockport City schools continued to “inch closer to using
facial recognition cameras.” Lockport Schools Inch Closer to Using Facial Recognition
Cameras, WGRZ (last updated Nov. 28, 2019, 6:37 AM), https://www.wgrz.com/article/
news/education/lockport-schools-inch-closer-to-using-facial-recognition-cameras/710f778827-c0d9-420b-97df-c05565d12083 [https://perma.cc/X8EH-V4JK]. On January 2,
2020, the school district activated its facial recognition system. Lockport stated that no
student data would be stored in its system, and the Education Department did not object to
the activation. See Thomas J. Prohaska, Lockport Schools Activate Facial Recognition
System, BUFFALO NEWS (Jan. 3, 2020), https://buffalonews.com/2020/01/03/lockportschools-activate-facial-recognition-system/ [https://perma.cc/W36S-UD9C].
238
Selinger is a professor and author who focuses on tech-ethics and privacy. See Bio,
EVAN SELINGER, http://eselinger.org/bio/ [https://perma.cc/T2QQ-YFPA].
239
Hartzog is a professor of law, computer science, privacy, and data protection. See
Woodrow Hartzog, NE. U. SCH. L., https://www.northeastern.edu/law/faculty/directory/
hartzog.html [https://perma.cc/DP3Z-D57V].
240
See Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, What Happens When Employers Can Read
Your Facial Expressions?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
10/17/opinion/facial-recognition-ban.html [https://perma.cc/TJY9-A68N].

1018

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:985

recognition should be banned in both the public and private sectors
because regulations that improve transparency and accountability
and reduce systemic bias still cannot adequately protect privacy and
freedom.241 Selinger and Hartzog also distinguish facial recognition
from other forms of biometric data by noting that faceprints are
easier to capture than biometrics such as fingerprints and DNA
which entities can only obtain through contact or samples.242
Additionally, they state that faces are “central to our identities” and
therefore deserve heightened protections.243 Selinger and Harzog
conclude that a ban on all use of facial recognition technology is
essential to preserve civil rights and privacy.244
In contrast to Selinger and Hartzog, the ACLU and New York
State Assembly only call for a temporary moratorium. They seem to
recognize that the government cannot halt the use of biometric
technology forever, and instead suggest that the government
implement regulations before innovation proceeds.245 Federal and
state governments have begun to address similar concerns with the
use of biometrics, and some regulations are already in place.
2. Existing Regulations
a) Common Concerns
As seen in the above-referenced New York State Assembly education bill,246 currently enacted and proposed statutes frequently

241

See id.
See id.
243
See id.
244
See id. The U.S. cities of San Francisco, Somerville, Oakland, Berkeley, Brookline,
and San Diego have already banned facial recognition. See Bruce Schneier, We’re Banning
Facial Recognition. We’re Missing the Point., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/opinion/facial-recognition-ban-privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/5PFX-386J]. On January 27, 2020, Senator Brad Hoylman introduced a
bill in the New York Senate that would ban law enforcement from using biometric
surveillance technology. See Massarah Mikati, NY Senate Bill Would Ban Police Facial
Recognition Technology, NNY360 (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.nny360.com/top_stories/
ny-senate-bill-would-ban-police-facial-recognition-technology/article_265b0d77-f7735e77-a037-7a02a50f0fbf.html [https://perma.cc/CV6C-W4NQ].
245
See Letter from ACLU, supra note 229; see also N.Y. Leg. Assemb. A06787 § 2e(2)(a), Reg. Sess. 2019–20 (N.Y. 2019).
246
See supra Part III.B.1.
242
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incorporate the following attributes: transparency, consent, security,
and remedies. Transparency can be achieved by first requiring
notice that an entity is using biometric identifiers.247 Then, the entity
should obtain consent for that use.248 Finally, all policies regarding
the data should be available to the public.249 It is important to note,
however, that many statutes do not require notice and consent when
the information is used for security purposes.250 Additionally,
protection of data is of the utmost concern. Data protection standards can include elements such as retention and deletion policies,
and the right for individuals to review their own data.251 Finally,
there must be a remedy for when an entity breaches the imposed
standards.252 Congress, the FTC, and many international countries
and states have already implemented plans or legislation to regulate
biometrics.253 Importantly, current statutes do not directly address
the inaccuracies of facial recognition technology. Yet it is crucial
for regulators to keep in mind the high false identification rates in
facial recognition.254 Frequently inaccurate results diminish the
value of facial data for both commercial and security purposes.
b) Federal Regulation
As yet, there is no federal statute that regulates the use of
biometric data. In March 2019, Senator Roy Blunt introduced the
Commercial Facial Recognition Act of 2019 (“CFRA”) into

247
See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(1)–(2) (2008); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 503.001(b) (West 2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020(1) (2017).
248
See, e.g., supra note 247.
249
See, e.g., Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119/1) Ch. 3, Art. 15 [hereinafter
GDPR].
250
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020(7); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
503.001(a).
251
See, e.g., GDPR at Ch. 3, Art. 17 and Ch. 2, Art. 7(3); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(a);
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(c)(3).
252
For example, Illinois’s BIPA allows private actions, whereas Texas’s Capture or Use
of Biometric Data statute only allows public actions to be brought by the attorney general.
Compare 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20, with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(d).
253
See infra Parts III.B.2.b–d.
254
See supra Part II.B.2.
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Congress.255 This Senate bill is limited in scope because it only
applies to facial recognition technology and not biometric data
generally.256 Though it is not likely to pass the first hurdle toward
enactment—getting out of committee257—the bill does provide
insight into how some members of Congress believe certain biometric data should be regulated.258 In particular, the CFRA requires
entities259 to notify individuals and obtain “affirmative consent” for
all uses of facial recognition technology.260 Affirmative consent
requires “individual, voluntary, and explicit consent” for the collection and use of data.261 The CFRA also has a notice-and-consent
exception for security purposes.262 The bill defines “security application” as “loss prevention and any other application intended to
detect or prevent criminal activity, including shoplifting and
fraud.”263 This bill delegates regulatory power to state attorneys
general and the FTC.264 As seen below, this delegation to the FTC
would really be an extension of the regulatory power that the FTC
already enjoys.

255

See generally Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019, S. 847, 116th
Cong. (2019).
256
See generally id. §§ 2(5)–(6).
257
See 116 Legislative Outlook S. 847; see also S. 847: Commercial Facial Recognition
Privacy Act of 2019, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/s847
[https://perma.cc/4YHQ-7Q49].
258
See Taylor Hatmaker, Bipartisan Bill Proposes Oversight for Commercial Facial
Recognition, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 14, 2019, 7:25 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/14/
facial-recognition-bill-commercial-facial-recognition-privacy-act/
[https://perma.cc/
XVK4-GMDY]. It should be noted that many members of Congress may not even know
how biometric technology works. Topics related to technology, such as the 2018 Facebook
hearings and bitcoin, have “baffled an elderly Congress.” Avi Selk, ‘There’s So Many
Different Things!’: How Technology Baffled an Elderly Congress in 2018, WASH. POST
(Jan. 2, 2019, 12:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/theres-somany-different-things-how-technology-baffled-an-elderly-congress-in-2018/2019/
01/02/f583f368-ffe0-11e8-83c0-b06139e540e5_story.html [https://perma.cc/3FJT-85J9].
259
S. 847 § 2(3). The CFRA defines a “covered entity” as people, including corporations
but excluding government, law enforcement, national security, and intelligence agencies.
Id.
260
Id. § 3(a).
261
Id. § 2(1). Even with consent, if harm to the user is reasonably foreseeable, the statute
requires “meaningful human review” of the data before it is used. Id. § 3(c).
262
Id. § 2(3)(B).
263
Id. § 2(9).
264
See id. § 4.
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The FTC is likely “the broadest and most influential regulating
force on information privacy in the United States.”265 The Commission investigates privacy breaches and protects consumers by
ending unfair and deceptive trade practices.266 Most of the FTC’s
actions conclude in an administrative settlement instead of litigation.267 Though the settlements are not binding precedent, they perform a similar function in guiding companies’ actions.268 Despite
contract law’s potential to govern privacy policies,269 the FTC has
become the de facto enforcer of privacy rights.270
The Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the FTC to
regulate unfair or deceptive acts affecting commerce.271 The FTC
currently has some deference when regulating biometric data in
commerce because, at present, the statute does not explicitly
reference this new technology, and, in the past, the FTC has taken
the initiative on regulating novel technologies, even when such
technologies are not explicitly regulated by the Federal Trade
Commission Act, as demonstrated below.
Currently, there are few precedential actions regulating
biometric data; however, actions relating to similar technologies can
inform how the FTC will opt to regulate the use of biometric data.
For example, in 2011, the FTC required Google Buzz to “implement
a comprehensive privacy program” as part of a settlement for use of
deceptive tactics when consumers joined its social network
platform.272 This was the first time the FTC mandated that a
company enact such a policy.273 The FTC is also likely to bring a
265

Solove & Hartzog, supra note 217, at 585.
See What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/5B3F-N5VX].
267
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 217, at 589.
268
See id.
269
See supra Part II.B.4.
270
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 217, at 600–01.
271
Cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012); Federal Trade Commission Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act
[https://perma.cc/4M5E-FNSH].
272
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in
Googles Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network (Mar. 31, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2011/03/ftc-charges-deceptive-privacy-practices-googles-rolloutits-buzz [https://perma.cc/4BJK-5U5Z].
273
See id.
266
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suit against companies who make deceptive statements to obtain
personal information from consumers.274 Additionally, the FTC
typically requires notice and choice.275 In 2012, the FTC required
Facebook to “giv[e] consumers clear and prominent notice and
obtain[] express consent” for all components of its privacy settings.276 In In re Gateway Learning Corp., the FTC described
“express affirmative . . . consent” as opting-in.277 In this situation,
Gateway changed its policy for selling data to third parties after
many consumers already purchased the product.278 By requiring an
opt-in to the changed policy, it seems that the FTC was emphasizing
the importance of consumers knowing exactly how their data was
being used before electing to use that product.
Though there are limited cases addressing biometric technology,
the FTC has issued some guidance directly dealing with regulating
facial recognition.279 In 2012, the same year as the Facebook
settlement, the FTC recommended “best practices for common uses
of facial technology” (“Best Practices”).280 In regards to notice and
consent, the FTC advised that companies provide notice and
“affirmative express consent”281 when using facial recognition
274

See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, District Court Bars the Sale of Consumers
Telephone Records to Third Parties (Jan. 28, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2008/01/district-court-bars-sale-consumers-telephone-records-third
[https://perma.cc/4YVJ-BFPC].
275
“Notice and choice” is the current archetype for digital data collection and use. It is
the heart of the GDPR and the California Consumer Privacy Act. See Richard Wagner &
Robert Sloan, Beyond Notice and Choice: Privacy Norms, and Consent, 14 J. HIGH TECH.
L. 370, 379 (2013); GDPR at Ch. 2, Art. 7(1).
276
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Settlement with Facebook
(Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/ftc-approvesfinal-settlement-facebook [https://perma.cc/5PTY-X25R].
277
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Gateway Learning Settles FTC Privacy Charges
(July 7, 2004), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2004/07/gatewaylearning-settles-ftc-privacy-charges [https://perma.cc/XYS4-5T82]. The FTC banned
Gateway from sharing its consumers’ personal information without express affirmative
consent. See id.
278
See id.
279
See FTC, BEST PRACTICES, supra note 30, at iii.
280
Id.
281
Id. The FTC opines that entities should obtain “affirmative consent” “at least” in
situations where biometric data is collected in a “materially different manner” than the
entity represented when it originally collected the data. This includes disseminating
information to sources that would not otherwise have access to that data. Id.
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technology in order to promote “privacy and safety.”282 The FTC’s
Best Practices also comment on data protection.283 The guidelines
acknowledge that “biometric data may be susceptible to breaches
and hacking.”284
The FTC addressed these two points via a case study where a
digital sign determined the “age range and gender of the customer
standing in front” of it and “display[ed] a targeted advertisement”
accordingly.285 Here, the FTC recommended a “sliding scale
approach to notice and consent.”286 For example, providing notice
so that consumers can avoid the sign might be okay when the sign
only detects age and gender and does not retain any information;
however, this might not constitute “meaningful” affirmative consent
if the sign identifies particular individuals.287 Additionally, the FTC
recommended that the company controlling the sign “implement
reasonable data security protections” to prevent third parties from
hacking the sign’s software.288 The Best Practices also
recommended that entities delete data when the original purpose for
collection is complete and, in the case of social media, when users
delete their accounts and therefore withdraw their consent.289
Instructively, the guidelines also note the known inaccuracies of
facial recognition technology.290
The FTC has applied the Best Practices in a few recent
actions.291 In July of 2019, Facebook and the FTC reached a
282

Id.
See generally id.
284
Id. at 7.
285
Id. at 13.
286
Id. at 16.
287
Id.
288
Id. at 13.
289
See id. at 18.
290
See id. at 3.
291
See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and
Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook (July 24, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penaltysweeping-new-privacy-restrictions [https://perma.cc/9WL2-TWCC]; Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Five Companies Settle FTC Allegations That They Falsely Claimed
Participation in the UE-U.S. Privacy Shield (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2019/09/five-companies-settle-ftc-allegations-they-falsely-claimed
[https://perma.cc/A42E-8FAQ].
283
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settlement292 over allegations that Facebook mishandled user
data.293 In addition to a $5 billion fine,294 Facebook agreed to
implement new, “unprecedented”295 regulations.296 One of these
regulations requires Facebook to “provide clear and conspicuous
notice of its use of facial recognition technology, and obtain
affirmative express user consent prior to any use that materially
exceeds its prior disclosures to users.”297 Further, the settlement
requires that Facebook “establish, implement, and maintain a
comprehensive data security program.”298 Shortly after Facebook
and the FTC reached this settlement, Facebook removed its
automatic suggested tagging feature.299 While the suggested tagging
feature still exists, users must now opt-in to using this feature.300
Though the settlement did not explicitly state that opt-in is necessary
to achieve “affirmative express user consent” that conforms to FTC
standards, Facebook’s new opt-in policy ultimately may set an
industry standard.301
More recently, in September 2019, the FTC settled its claim
against facial recognition software provider 214 Technologies, Inc.

292

This case was brought in reaction to the Cambridge Analytica scandal, when
Cambridge Analytica improperly obtained data from Facebook to construct voter profiles
in 2016. See Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and
the Fallout So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/
us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html [https://perma.cc/V6GG-XYH9]; see
also FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on
Facebook, supra note 291.
293
See Ben Gilbert, Alongside a $5 Billion Fine, the US Government Just Imposed a
Bunch of Restrictions on What Facebook Can and Can’t Do: Here’s the Full List, BUS.
INSIDER (July 24, 2019, 10:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-hit-withregulations-in-ftc-settlement-full-list-2019-7 [https://perma.cc/9VYY-CRNP].
294
This is the largest fine the FTC has ever imposed for a consumer privacy violation.
See FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook,
supra note 291.
295
Id.
296
See Gilbert, supra note 293.
297
Id.
298
FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on
Facebook, supra note 291.
299
See Gilbert, supra note 293.
300
See id.
301
FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on
Facebook, supra note 291.
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(“214 Tech”).302 The FTC alleged that 214 Tech falsely claimed
it certified itself under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield framework.303
As part of the consent agreement, the FTC prohibited 214 Tech
from misrepresenting its participation in privacy or data security
programs.304
The Facebook and 214 Tech settlements, along with the FTC’s
2012 guidelines, suggest that the FTC is likely to find misrepresentations and omissions about use of facial recognition, and possibly
other forms of biometric data, not just deceptive, but also unfair.305
Further, the two facial recognition enforcement actions against
Facebook and 214 Tech occurred within three months of each other
and are quite recent.306 Thus, these actions could signify a continuing trend of rigorous FTC monitoring and penalizing improper uses
of biometrics.
c) International Regulation
A prominent international regulation is the EU’s General Data
Privacy Regulation (“GDPR”).307 Implemented on May 25, 2018,
this comprehensive, first-of-its-kind data privacy regulation strives
to “protect all EU citizens from privacy and data breaches in today’s

302

See Five Companies Settle FTC Allegations That They Falsely Claimed Participation
in the UE-U.S. Privacy Shield, supra note 291.
303
See id. The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield is a framework of data protection requirements
created by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the European Commission and Swiss
Administration. This framework protects data transferred during transatlantic commerce.
See Welcome to the Privacy Shield, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, https://www.
privacyshield.gov/welcome [https://perma.cc/B6VT-WK39].
304
See Five Companies Settle FTC Allegations That They Falsely Claimed Participation
in the UE-U.S. Privacy Shield, supra note 291.
305
The FTC considers egregious deceptive practices unfair. See Solove & Hartzog, supra
note 217, at 631. This is bolstered by commissioner J. Thomas Rosch’s dissenting
statement in the 2012 guidelines where he disagrees with the majority’s “insistence that
the ‘unfairness’ prong, rather than the ‘deception’ prong . . . should govern practices
relating to facial recognition technology.” FTC, BEST PRACTICES, supra note 30 (Rosch, J.,
dissenting).
306
The Facebook order was issued in July 2019 and the Tech Order 214 in September
2019. See FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on
Facebook, supra note 291; Five Companies Settle FTC Allegations That They Falsely
Claimed Participation in the UE-U.S. Privacy Shield, supra note 291.
307
See EU GDPR, https://eugdpr.org [https://perma.cc/FE8N-ARDT].
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data-driven world.”308 The GDPR requires consent before
businesses process consumer data.309 When businesses request that
consent, the request must be “intelligible and easily accessible.”310
Further, consumers can withdraw consent “at any time.”311 Consumers are also able to obtain information about whether third
parties are using their data and where and for what purpose their data
is being used.312 Additionally, businesses must provide consumers
with copies of their personal data.313 In regards to security exceptions, the EU gives its Member States considerable leeway.314
Namely, the GDPR is “not applicable to criminal prosecution,” and
all related data processing “by competent authorities” is exempt.315
Further, the GDRP does not apply to Member States processing data
“regarding national and common security.”316
To protect consumer data, the GDPR contains a deletion policy.317 There are two routes for deletion. First, companies must
delete data once they achieve their original purpose for collecting
the data.318 Second, individuals can withdraw consent and therefore
have personal data deleted.319 In the event of a violation, the GDPR
permits both public enforcement and private litigation.320 While
“supervisory authorities” regulate companies that fall under the

308

GDPR Key Changes, EU GDPR, https://eugdpr.org/the-regulation/ (last visited Sept.
12, 2019); GDPR at Ch. 4, Art. 35 (requiring a “data protection impact assessment” to help
prevent data breaches).
309
See GDPR at Ch. 2, Art. 7(1).
310
Id. at Ch. 2, Art. 7(2).
311
Id. at Ch. 2, Art. 7(3).
312
Id. at Ch. 3, Art. 15(1)(a)–(d).
313
Id. at Ch. 3, Art. 15(3).
314
See id. at Rec. 16, 19.
315
Id. at Rec. 19. Note that there is a separate Directive that governs data processing for
criminal enforcement. See Directive (EU) 2016/680, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention,
Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal
Penalties, and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Council Framework
Decision 2008/977/JHA, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 89.
316
GDPR at Rec. 16.
317
See id. at Ch. 3, Art. 17; id. at Ch. 2, Art. 7(3).
318
See id. at Ch. 3, Art. 17.
319
See id. at Ch. 2, Art. 7(3).
320
See id. at Ch. 8, Sect. 82.
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GDPR, private individuals are permitted to “lodge a complaint with
a supervisory authority.”321 For example, on the day that the GDPR
went into effect, “European privacy advocate” Max Schrems322 filed
suits against Google and Facebook, seeking a combined $8.8 billion
in damages.323 Schrems alleged that the companies violated Article
6 of the GDPR by forcing consent before consumers could use their
services.324 In January 2019, the French data protection authority
fined Google $57 million, thus demonstrating Member States’ willingness to enforce the GDPR soon after its enactment.325
d) State Regulations
i. Enacted Regulations
a. Illinois
In 2008, Illinois became the first state to regulate biometric data
with its Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”).326 Through
BIPA, the Illinois legislature aims to serve “public welfare, security,
and safety”327 by regulating “biometric identifiers” such as fingerprints and face geometry.328 The act has a two-step process to ensure
transparency between “private entit[ies]” and consumers.329 First,
321

Id. at Ch. 8, Art. 77.
Where Are We Now? Six Months Into the GDPR, XPAN L. GROUP (Jan. 15, 2019),
https://xpanlawgroup.com/where-are-we-now-six-months-into-the-gdpr/
[https://perma.cc/M4X3-264A] [hereinafter Where Are We Now?].
323
See Russell Brandom, Facebook and Google Hit With $8.8 Billion in Lawsuits on Day
One of GDPR, VERGE (May 25, 2019, 10:21 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/
5/25/17393766/facebook-google-gdpr-lawsuit-max-schrems-europe
[https://perma.cc/4WGT-6HMJ].
324
See Where Are We Now?, supra note 322.
325
See Adam Satariao, Google Is Fined $57 Million Under Europe’s Data Privacy Law,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/technology/googleeurope-gdpr-fine.html [https://perma.cc/4WGT-6HMJ].
326
See Thomas F. Zych, Steven G. Stransky & Brian Doyle-Wenger, State Biometric
Privacy Laws: What You Need to Know, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ebc0e01c-45cc-4d50-959e-75434b93b250
[https://perma.cc/BJE7-8CVE].
327
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(g) (2008).
328
Id. 14/10. Face geometry is measured through metrics such as distance between eyes
and distance from forehead to chin. See Steve Symanovich, How Does Facial Recognition
https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-iot-how-facial-recognitionWork?,
NORTON,
software-works.html [https://perma.cc/F8ZV-9H78].
329
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b).
322
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BIPA requires entities to disclose in writing that biometric
information is being collected or stored, and for what specific
purpose and length of time this information is being collected,
stored, and used.330 Then, the “subject of the biometric identifier”
must provide written release for the stated uses.331 Additionally, no
information can be sold or disseminated without consent.332
The notice and consent policies in this statute strive to wholeheartedly protect the privacy interests of individuals.333 BIPA
achieves this protection by requiring private entities to obtain notice
and consent for any use of individuals’ biometric data.334 The act
defines “private entity” as any individual, partnership, corporation,
limited liability company, association, or other group, however
organized, but explicitly excludes “[s]tate and local government
agencies.”335 Therefore, the statute’s notice and consent requirements exclude government-supported security systems, yet apply to
private security companies.336 BIPA also recognizes the importance
of data protection by requiring that “private entities . . . store,
transmit, and protect from disclosure all biometric identifiers and
biometric information using the reasonable standard of care within
the private entity’s industry.”337 Further, BIPA mandates “permanent destruction” of the information once the initial purpose of the
collection is complete, or “within 3 years of the individual’s last interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first.”338
The most notable feature of BIPA, however, is its private cause
of action to remedy breaches.339 This private cause of action allows
an individual to recover damages after a breach.340 An individual
can recover up to $1,000 or actual damages for a negligent

330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340

See id. 14/15(b)(1)–(2).
Id. 14/15(b)(3).
See id. 14/15(c)–(d).
See generally id. 14/15.
Id.
Id. 14/10.
See id.
Id. 14/15(e)(1).
Id. 14/15(a).
See id. 14/20.
See id.
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violation,341 or up to $5,000 for a reckless or intentional violation,342
as well as attorney fees,343 and other relief, such as an injunction.344
One of the first major cases to be brought under BIPA was
against Facebook in 2016.345 The plaintiffs alleged that Facebook’s
“tag suggestions” violated BIPA due to Facebook’s failure to
provide notice that it collected biometric data, failure to provide a
retention schedule and deletion guidelines, and failure to obtain
written consent from users.346 After being removed from Illinois
state court to the Northern District of California, the district court
issued an opinion in 2018.347 The court did not dispute that clicking
a box to agree to the “Terms of Use” and “Privacy Policy” constituted written consent;348 the heart of the issue was whether a photograph fell within BIPA’s definition of biometric data.349 Facebook
maintained that because the statute includes the word “scan” but not
the word “photograph[],” this must mean that “face geometry” could
only be collected in person.350 The Northern District of California
disagreed; it viewed Facebook’s “cramped interpretation” as inconsistent with BIPA’s purpose.351 The Northern District of California
then certified the class in 2018.352 Facebook appealed the certification and claimed that the plaintiffs did not achieve Article III
341

See id. 14/20(1).
See id. 14/20(2).
343
See id. 14/20(3).
344
See id. 14/20(4).
345
See generally In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155,
1159 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
346
Id.
347
This case was originally filed in Illinois state court, but Facebook removed it to federal
court under the Class Action Fairness Act. See Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948,
951 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
348
Id. at 1163; see also Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 717 F. App’x
12, 13–14 (2d Cir. 2017) (stating that viewing terms and conditions on the screen and
clicking “continue” qualifies as written consent under BIPA).
349
See In re Facebook, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1159, 1170.
350
Id. at 1171 (quoting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 12–13, In re Facebook, 185 F.
Supp. 3d 1155, ECF No. 69).
351
Id.; see also Monroy v. Shutterfly, No. 16 C 10984, 2017 WL 4099846 at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 15, 2017) (holding that biometric data Shutterfly obtained from photographs
constitutes “biometric data” under BIPA).
352
See In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 326 F.R.D. 535, 549 (N.D. Cal.
2018); cf. Rivera v. Google, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1003, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2018), where
the Northern District of Illinois dismissed a BIPA suit, reasoning that “feeling offended”
342
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standing.353 In August 2019, the Ninth Circuit rejected Facebook’s
argument and affirmed the district court’s decision which held that
Facebook violated the plaintiffs’ “concrete privacy interests”
protected by BIPA.354 The Ninth Circuit issued this decision a little
over half a year after the Supreme Court of Illinois decided Rosenbach v. Six Flags.355
Rosenbach v. Six Flags addressed whether actual harm is
necessary to achieve Article III standing under BIPA.356 Plaintiff
Rosenbach’s mother sued Six Flags for failing to obtain her consent
to collect her son’s fingerprints, which were used to issue a repeatentry pass.357 The court grappled with the question of whether a
plaintiff must claim “actual injury or adverse effect” to bring suit.358
The court decided that question in the negative: “violation of [one’s]
rights under” BIPA is sufficient to achieve standing.359 The court
reasoned that “procedural protections are particularly crucial in our
digital world,” thus violating a privacy statue results in “real and
significant” injury.360 Since the court filed this “highly anticipated”

that Google Photos collected data using facial recognition technology did not qualify as
“concrete injuries for Article III purposes.” Id. at 1003, 1014. In 2019, the plaintiffs filed
appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, but the appeals remain
pending. See id., appeals docketed, No. 19–1182 (Jan. 28, 2019), No. 19–1942 (Feb. 8,
2019).
353
See Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No.
19–706, 2020 WL 283288 (Jan. 21, 2020). In January of 2020, Facebook settled the
biometric information privacy suit for $550 million. The money will cover the plaintiff’s
legal fees, and the rest will go to eligible Illinois users. See Natasha Singer and Mike Isaac,
Facebook to Pay $550 Million to Settle Facial Recognition Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2020)
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/technology/facebook-privacy-lawsuitearnings.html [https://perma.cc/SNH8-RT5U].
354
Patel, 932 F.3d at 1275.
355
Both of these cases determined that a violation of rights under BIPA achieves Article
III standing. See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1207 (Ill. 2019);
Patel, 932 F.3d at 1274–75.
356
See generally Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d 1197.
357
See id. at 1200–01.
358
Id. at 1207.
359
Id.
360
Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1206 (quoting Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948,
954 (N.D. Cal. 2018)).
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decision in January of 2019, there has been an influx of lawsuits,361
and many more suits are likely to follow.362
b. Texas
Following Illinois’ lead, Texas passed the Capture or Use of
Biometric Identifier Act (“CUBI”) in 2009.363 CUBI prohibits the
capture, sale, or disclosure of an individual’s “biometric identifiers”
such as fingerprints and face geometry364 “for commercial purpose”365 unless the collecting entity notifies the individual and that
individual consents.366 This requirement is distinct from BIPA
because it (1) targets data collected for “commercial purpose,”367 as
opposed to any private entity that possesses biometric information,368 and (2) requires consent, though not necessarily written
consent,369 unlike BIPA which requires written consent.370 Since
CUBI only applies to information used for “commercial purposes,”
this could encompass private security forces.371 Like BIPA, CUBI’s
data protection clause establishes a reasonable care standard.372 It
mandates that biometric data be “stor[ed], transmit[ed] and protect[ed] from disclosure . . . using reasonable care.”373 Additionally,
CUBI’s deletion policy calls for destruction of data “within a reasonable time, but not later than the first anniversary of the date
361

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, June 2019: The Rise of Biometrics Laws
and Litigation, JD SUPRA (June 28, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/june-2019the-rise-of-biometrics-laws-82168/ [https://perma.cc/4FJN-Z948].
362
See Christine E. Skoczylas & Dana Amato Sarros, No Harm, No Foul? Not So Fast:
The Illinois Supreme Court Allows BIPA Lawsuits Without Allegations of Actual Injury,
NAT’L L. REV. (June 5, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/no-harm-no-foulnot-so-fast-illinois-supreme-court-allows-bipa-lawsuits-without [https://perma.cc/FVT6CSBN]. This increase is expected as a reaction to multiple recent decisions holding that
violating BIPA satisfies the actual harm required to achieve Article III standing under
Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). See id.; see also Patel, 932 F.3d at 1274–75.
363
See generally TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (West 2019).
364
Id. § 503.001(a).
365
Id. § 503.001(b)–(c).
366
See id. § 503.001(b).
367
Id.
368
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008).
369
See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(b).
370
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(3).
371
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(b)–(c).
372
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(e)(1); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(2).
373
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(2).
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the purpose for collecting the identifier expires.”374 Finally, CUBI’s
mandated remedy is a civil penalty brought by the attorney general.375 This publicly enforceable remedy is much more restrictive
than BIPA’s private cause of action.376
c. Washington
Most recently, in 2017, Washington passed legislation regulating biometric identifiers such as fingerprints and “other unique
biological patterns or characteristics.”377 Like CUBI, Washington’s
statute regulates data collection for commercial purposes,378 and
requires notice and consent for the collection, sale, and disclosure of
biometric information.379 The statute specifies that commercial purpose means “in furtherance of [a] sale,” or via “disclosure to a third
party” for marketing purposes.380
Similar to the proposed federal act, Washington’s biometric
information statute exempts notice and consent when data is
collected for security purposes.381 The statute defines “security
purposes” as “preventing shoplifting, fraud, or any other misappropriation or theft of a thing of value, including tangible and intangible
goods, services, and other purposes in furtherance of protecting the
security or integrity of software, accounts, applications, online services, or any person.”382 Additionally, the statuterequires that those
knowingly in possession of biometric data “take reasonable care to
guard against unauthorized access to and acquisition” of that data.383
The Washington statute also protects consumer data through its
retention policy, which allows entities to retain the data only as long
as retention is “reasonably necessary” to: (1) “comply with a court
order, statute, or public records”; (2) protect against security and
other related threats; or (3) provide the services for which the

374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383

Id. § 503.001(c)(3).
See id. § 503.001(d).
See id. § 503.001(d); cf. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008).
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010(1) (2017).
See id. § 19.375.020(3).
See id. § 19.375.020(1), (3). Written consent is not necessarily required. See id.
Id. § 19.375.010(4).
Id. § 19.375.020(7).
Id. § 19.375.010(8).
Id. § 19.375.020 (4)(a).
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information was originally collected.384 Lastly, like CUBI, this
Washington statute is “enforced solely by the attorney general.”385
d. California
In June 2018, California governor Jerry Brown signed the
California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”).386 The Act went into
effect January 1, 2020.387 It is the first U.S. statute modeled on the
EU’s GDPR.388 A major component of the statute is its disclosure
requirements.389 The CCPA requires companies to notify consumers
about what information it is collecting and why it is collecting that
data.390 Consumers also have the right to request that a business
disclose the categories of information it collects, the sources that the
information came from, the purposes it collects the information for,
the categories of third parties the company shares the information
with, and specific pieces of information the company collected.391
This Act is expected to significantly increase the transparency
obligations that California organizations owe consumers.392
Notably, these transparency requirements apply to all “business
purposes,” including “security incidents.”393
The Act also allows consumers to request that a company delete
their information.394 Further, companies must present consumers
with an easy way to opt-out of having their information sold to third
parties.395 Additionally, the law provides heightened safeguards for
minors: children under sixteen must affirmatively opt-in and
384

Id. § 19.375.020(4)(b).
Id. § 19.375.030(2).
386
See generally Mark G. McCreary, California Consumer Privacy Act: What You Need
to Know, N.J. L.J. (Dec. 1, 2018), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2018/12/01/thecalifornia-consumer-privacy-act-what-you-need-to-know/?src=EMCEmail&et=CustomAlerts&bu=ALM&pt=CustomAlerts [https://perma.cc/3N44-G9HQ].
387
See id.
388
See id.
389
See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (2018).
390
See id. § 1798.100(b).
391
See id. § 1798.100(a).
392
See Your Readiness Roadmap for the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA),
PWC, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/consulting/cybersecurity/california-consumer
-privacy-act.html [https://perma.cc/5J6M-QLZK].
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CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(d)(2).
394
See id. § 1798.105(a).
395
See id. § 1798.120(a).
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children under thirteen must obtain parental consent to have their
personal information sold to third parties.396 Finally, now that the
CCPA is in effect, its private cause of action will likely contribute
to the increase in litigation spurred by BIPA.397
ii. Proposed Regulations
e. New York
New York is also contemplating regulating biometric data.398
Currently, a bill establishing a biometric privacy act is in the New
York Senate’s Consumer Protection Committee.399 The Senate bill
proposes regulation of the use of biometric data such as retinas and
iris scans, fingerprints, and face geometry400 by private entities.401
The bill requires written notice and consent for any collection,
storage, or dissemination of data.402 It also requires a written policy
conveying the company’s reason for collecting the information and
its retention schedule and guidelines for destruction.403 The bill
states that destruction must occur when the original purpose for
obtaining the data has been fulfilled or “within three years of the
individual’s last interaction with the private entity, whichever

396

See id. § 1798.120(d).
See Alston & Bird, The CCPA Could Reset Data Breach Litigation Risks, JD SUPRA
(Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-ccpa-could-reset-data-breach14801/ [https://perma.cc/M46Q-BYTL].
398
This bill is different than the New York bill discussed in Part III.B.1 because that bill
only changes the Education Law. See N.Y. Legis. Assemb. A06787 § 2-e, Reg. Sess. 2019–
20 (N.Y. 2019). There is also a bill pending in the New York City Council. This bill applies
to all privately or publicly owned facilities where athletic games are held. It requires a
“clear and conspicuous sign” that states what information is being collected. It also requires
online notice of the amount of time the data is collected for, the type of information
collected, any privacy policy, and whether the information is sent to third parties.
Government agencies are excluded from this bill, and there is both a private and public
cause of action. Requiring Businesses to Notify Customers of the Use of Biometric
Identifier Technology Before the Comm. on Consumer Affairs and Bus. Licensing, N.Y.C.
Council 2018 Reg. Sess., Int. No. 1170 (N.Y.C. 2018).
399
See generally S.B. S1203, 2019–2020 Leg. Sess. (N.Y 2019), available at
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s1203 [https://perma.cc/V58J-HSQB].
400
Id. § 676-a.
401
Id. § 676-b. Note that government agencies are explicitly excluded from this bill, thus
raising the issue of how effective this bill will be. See id. § 676-a(4).
402
See id. § 676-b.
403
See id.
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occurs first.”404 Additionally, to protect data, companies must use a
“reasonable standard of care” to “store, transmit, and protect” information from disclosure.405 Finally, the bill proposes a private cause
of action.406 New York legislators have been considering this bill for
three years, so it appears unlikely that the legislators will pass it.407
IV. THE FUTURE OF BIOMETRICS IN SPORTS VENUES: A NATIONAL
REGULATION?
This Note has commented on the benefits and concerns of using
biometric data in sports venues. While this Note recognizes the
benefits of using biometric data, including convenience, safety and
security, and customer experience,408 these benefits are likely outweighed by significant accuracy, security, and privacy concerns.409
The unique and permanent nature of biometric data makes privacy
and security breaches irreparable in a way that does not apply to
other data breaches, such as credit card and password breaches.410
This heightened risk necessitates some degree of monitoring.
Though biometric technology can shorten lines,411 enhance security,412 and aid advertisers in placing advertisements effectively,413
these rewards do not outweigh the risks of data breaches414 and
inaccurate technology.415 Further, regulation must be enacted with
urgency to preempt these risks from soon becoming a reality.
A. The FTC’s Expertise in Privacy Regulation
The FTC’s historic role as the United States’ most influential
privacy regulator416 makes it the natural choice as the regulator of
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416

Id.
Id. § 676-b(5)(A).
See id. § 676-c.
See Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, supra note 361.
See supra, Part II.A.
See supra, Part II.B.
See Krishan & Mostafavi, supra note 156, at 19.
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 217, at 585.
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biometric data, an inherently consumer-centric metric.417 Sports
spectators double as fans and consumers, and thus it is the mission
of the FTC to protect them.418 The FTC’s expertise in technology,
privacy regulation, and unfair and deceptive trade practices generally makes it the preferred regulator of biometric data. The Commission regulates other technologies such as websites,419 and has
already begun to regulate biometric information.420 Thus, it should
be the FTC, not courts, that enforces misuses of biometric data.421
Further, the private cause of action that statutes such as BIPA contain has resulted in numerous lawsuits that place a burden on the
judiciary’s limited time and resources.422 Additionally, these cases
would likely result in a low amount of actual damages for the individuals that bring suits. Thus, bringing a suit is likely not worth the
time and money spent on the litigation. Limiting regulation to a designated federal watchdog with expertise in the area—the FTC—
would curtail the number of suits and therefore promote judicial
economy. Considering the number of people who attend sporting
events, and therefore the number of people who could bring suits
against venues, the potential for an overwhelming number of lawsuits is substantial.
B. The Importance of Uniformity
Further, this proposed regulatory scheme should be administered at a national level to achieve uniformity across venues in all
states. The current ease of nationwide travel makes uniformity
particularly important. Inconsistency could inconvenience spectators who would not know what to expect when visiting other states.
For example, a devoted member of the Mets 7 Line Army may travel
417

See Porter, supra note 19.
See About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc
[https://perma.cc/MZ9V-ANET].
419
See supra, Part III.B.2.b.
420
See supra, Part III.B.2.b.
421
See Trevor Timm, Technology Law Will Soon Be Reshaped by People Who Don’t Use
Email, GUARDIAN (May 3, 2014, 7:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2014/may/03/technology-law-us-supreme-court-internet-nsa
[https://perma.cc/E7HANBST] (commenting that the Supreme Court’s lack of technological knowledge will be
detrimental when deciding new issues about technology).
422
See Judicial Economy Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL, https://definitions.
uslegal.com/j/judicial-economy/ [https://perma.cc/2ZPD-VW5W].
418
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to the Citizens Bank Park in Philadelphia to attend a Mets-Phillies
game.423 If Citizens Bank Park has different standards than Citi
Field for using and regulating biometric technology, that Mets fan
will likely not be familiar with the Phillies’ stadium standards.424
Ideally, Congress will pass a national legislation.
However, Congress’s first attempt at creating biometric data
oversight—the Commercial Facial Recognition Act—is not likely
to become law.425 Further, this Act would only be a partial solution
since it only addresses a single type of biometric identifier: commercial facial recognition.426 Moreover, passing any legislation is a notoriously prolonged process. Due to the many concerns about using
biometric data and the grave implications of an insufficient regulation,427 regulation must be implemented as fast as possible.428 Thus,
until Congress codifies a nationwide legislation, the most practical
solution is to defer oversight of biometric technology to the FTC and
encourage the Commission to augment its enforcement efforts.429
The FTC should draw upon its prior decisions in technology privacy
cases, as well as the existing state biometric statutes that are paving
the way of biometric regulation. In particular, the FTC should
encourage maximum protection against data breaches and emphasize meaningful notice and consent, as expanded upon below.

423

The 7 Line Army is a group of Mets fans that attend home and away Mets games. See
About Us, 7 LINE, https://the7line.com/pages/about-us [https://perma.cc/9QLB-5PVH].
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Citizens Bank Park is the ballpark of the Philadelphia Phillies. See Citizens Bank Park,
MLB, https://www.mlb.com/phillies/ballpark [https://perma.cc/63AU-93BE].
425
See 116 Legislative Outlook S. 847, supra note 257; S. 847: Commercial Facial
Recognition Privacy Act of 2019, supra note 257.
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See S. 847: Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019, supra note 257.
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See supra Part II.B.
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Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos supports regulation of facial recognition technology. He
states that the technology has “really positive uses, so you don’t want to put the brakes on
it.” Jason Del Ray, Jeff Bezos Says Amazon Is Writing Its Own Facial Recognition Laws to
Pitch to Lawmakers, VOX (Sept. 26, 2019, 12:55 AM), https://www.vox.com/
recode/2019/9/25/20884427/jeff-bezos-amazon-facial-recognition-draft-legislationregulation-rekognition [https://perma.cc/U7W7-BH48].
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The recent FTC settlements regarding biometric data could be an indication that the
FTC is already increasing its enforcement. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
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C. Venues Must Protect Spectators from Data Breaches
When venues collect biometric data, they must take all
reasonable measures to ensure that data is protected from breaches.
Biometric data is an irreplaceable, personal identifier.430 Once that
data becomes public, it cannot be made private again.431 Thus, like
most of the state regulatory schemes currently in effect, the FTC
should use a reasonable care standard to protect spectators from the
harms of data breaches.432
D. Transparency is a Necessity
The current state statutes, as well as prior FTC decisions, require
notice and meaningful consent.433 Two common critiques of the
notice component are that consumers do not read the notice, or that
the notice is too difficult to locate or comprehend.434 However, these
critiques do not negate the importance of meaningful notice.
Progress on regulation will likely halt if people are unaware of what
data entities collect. Regulators will not know what to regulate, and
consumers cannot provide their input if they do not know that
entities collect their data, how the entities use the data, and for
how long the data is retained. Stadiums have successfully notified
fans of new policies, such as when the NFL changed its bag policy
in 2015.435 The NFL created its new bag policy that only allows
small bags or medium-sized clear bags “[t]o provide a safer environment for the public.”436 The NFL disseminated this information
through an announcement on its website,437 updated policies on

430

See Porter, supra note 19.
See Baraniuk, supra note 161.
432
See, e.g., Biometric Information Privacy Act, 2007 Ill. SB 2400 § 15(e)(1) (2008);
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(c)(2) (West 2019).
433
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can be satisfied verbally or by actions, such as walking in front of a sign with a notice that
it uses biometric data. See id.
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See Wagner & Sloan, supra note 275, at 7–8.
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See NFL Stadium Bag Policy, NFL (last updated Nov. 14, 2015, 3:28 PM),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000579441/article/nfl-stadium-bag-policy
[https://perma.cc/FRB4-XSK5].
436
Id.
437
See id.
431

2020]

THE PRISON OF CONVENIENCE

1039

team websites,438 and articles published by independent news
sources.439 Venues should disclose biometric policies through
similar communications.
The FTC has already demonstrated that it considers notice of
biometric information policies important. In its 2019 settlement with
Facebook, the FTC required “clear and conspicuous notice.”440 If
the FTC continues to apply this standard to uses of biometric data,
as it should, sports venues have many methods by which they can
provide spectators with clear and conspicuous notice. For example,
venue staff can provide notice by briefing spectators on an
applicable fingerprinting policy before they scan their fingerprints.441 Tickets should also contain notice of such policies.442
Further, venues should post policies on their websites along with
their other procedures, such as bag policies.443
Determining what constitutes meaningful consent is a more
challenging task. For example, current state statutes disagree about
whether written consent is required.444 To explain the consent prong,
the FTC’s Best Practice Guidelines used the example of digital signs
that recognize demographic characteristics.445 This directly applies
to signage in sports venues such as Madison Square Garden.446 The
FTC used this case study to articulate a sliding scale approach to
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https://www.businessinsider.com/the-nfl-tightens-security-after-attacks-on-paris-2015-11
[https://perma.cc/G84P-PZEW].
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442
Many tickets already do contain notice of biometric policies. See Golden & Chemi,
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notice and consent.447 The more private the data collected, the higher
the standard of consent.448 For example, walking in front of a sign
that a spectator knows detects demographics such as age is consent,
whereas more affirmative consent may be required for a sign that
can identify a particular individual.449 This approach seems to balance the customer experience and innovative benefits of collecting
biometric information with the aforementioned privacy concerns.
In its recent settlement with Facebook, the FTC required Facebook to obtain “affirmative express user consent prior to any use
that materially exceeds its prior disclosures to users.”450 It seems
that Facebook interpreted this to mean opt-in, yet it is not clear that
was necessarily the FTC’s intent.451 Sports venues could request
affirmative express consent in multiple ways. For example, if a
vendor disclosed to a spectator, either verbally or with a sign next to
the register, that by scanning his fingerprint to purchase a beer, his
credit card would be charged and his age would be verified, consent
by action should be enough. However, if the machine also recorded
that specific spectator’s purchases as information to be distributed
to third parties, that should require more explicit, affirmative, and
express consent such as a signed consent form.
E. Security is No Exception
This Note posits that in the optimal regulatory solution, i.e., a
federal scheme administered by the FTC, the Commission should
not follow the lead of statutes that except security uses of biometric
technology from transparency regulations.452 If anything, recent
evidence of inaccuracies should put venues on notice that the
benefits of this technology might not be as sure as they were once
thought to be. Security forces can include both government officials
stationed at venues and private stadium security. Sporting events’
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susceptibility to criminal breaches and terrorist-scale attacks
necessitates heightened security.453 Yet, biometric security
technology is not necessarily the means to that end. Perhaps it could
be in the future; however, at this point in the development of facial
recognition, the technology is too flawed to be effective. Thus, while
biometric technology conjures a perception of model security,
venues must consider the empirical evidence of inaccuracies with
facial recognition technology.454 The repercussions of inaccurate
facial recognition bolster the need for expeditious regulation of such
technology.455 Accordingly, regulators should evaluate not only
how to regulate facial recognition’s use, but also if venues should
use it at all. The FTC should apply the same approach to regulating
security uses of biometrics as it does for commercial uses. For
example, evidence supports the accuracy of fingerprinting, thus the
same notice and consent may be sufficient.456 However, studies on
facial recognition technology reveal its imprecisions, which
indicates that this technology may not be ready for stadium use.457
Many state and local governments already question the use of
facial recognition for security purposes. Cities such as Oakland have
banned its local government from using facial recognition,458 and
California’s governor recently signed a bill that became effective in
2020, which bans police from using facial recognition on body cameras for three years.459 Stadiums and arenas are distinct from cities

453

See WOODWARD, supra note 117, at 3.
See Natasha Singer, Amazon Is Pushing Facial Technology That a Study Says Could
Be Biased, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/
technology/amazon-facial-technology-study.html [https://perma.cc/J6EM-TWP2].
455
See supra Part II.B.
456
See NIST Study Shows Computerized Fingerprint Matching Is Highly Accurate,
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (July 6, 2004), https://www.nist.gov/newsevents/news/2004/07/nist-study-shows-computerized-fingerprint-matching-highlyaccurate [https://perma.cc/8NG6-EQ27].
457
See supra Part II.B.2.
458
See Sara Merken, Berkeley Bans Government Face Recognition Use, Joining Other
Cities, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 16, 2019, 2:22 PM) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacyand-data-security/hold-berkeley-bans-government-face-recognition-use-joining-othercities (subscription paywall).
459
See Bryan Anderson, New Law Bans California Cops from Using Facial Recognition
Tech on Body Cameras, SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 8, 2019, 7:38 PM), https://www.
sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article235940507.html.
454

1042

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:985

and states because they are private venues where obtaining and
regulating notice and consent is plausible. This gives spectators
more autonomy over their data than a person walking on a
public street.
Yet the FTC must still consider the unavoidable harms of flawed
biometric security technology. When entities inaccurately collect
information for commercial or trade purposes, the potential harm
is an improperly targeted advertisement; when entities inaccurately
collect information for security purposes, the potential harm is
an undetected criminal or an innocent person falsely accused of
a crime. This potential for substantial, grave ramifications seems to
fit directly into the FTC’s description of an unfair trade practice—
“likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed
by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”460 Thus,
until facial recognition technology is improved, an FTC-enforced
moratorium on its use for security at sports venues is justified
and should be implemented as soon as possible to avoid injury
to spectators.
CONCLUSION
Determining how to regulate new technologies and their
corresponding data mining is a formidable feat, particularly when
the technology is so new that it is still developing and its implications are still being discovered. Though not a flawless remedy,
looking to existing biometric regulations and regulations of similar
technologies and data can help guide that determination. To promote
unity, there should be a single, national regulation. While a federal
statute would achieve this, the uncertainty surrounding this new
biometric technology calls for instant regulation. Thus, the FTC is
best positioned to develop and enforce immediate regulation of biometric data. While state statutes govern portions of the country, the
FTC is able to uniformly regulate the entire country. Additionally,
the FTC has an extensive history in regulating new technologies that
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could pose privacy concerns.461 Therefore, the FTC should extend
the notice-and-consent regime it already applies to technologies
similar to biometric technology. Further, the FTC should require
entities to take utmost care to prevent breaches of spectator data. In
doing so, the FTC is positioned to uncover deceptive and unfair
practices and enforce policy breaches while still allowing the
convenience and security benefits that biometric technology strives
to provide.
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